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INSTITUTE FOR INTEGRATED TRANSITIONS

Inside the Transition Bubble: International Expert Assistance in Tunisia

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Executive Summary

Following the January 2011 revolt against President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia had its first exposure to the vast complex of international expert assistance for transitions. It was a new experience as well for international actors, many of whom had turned a blind eye or been denied full access to the country and were thus unfamiliar with its aspirations. More than two years into Tunisia's transition, results have been mixed: growing ambivalence and confusion about roles and responsibilities prevail. Yet internationals can take simple measures to implement their activities more effectively, and nationals can become more directive in the relationship. This would put the transition on a better track, and help inspire more effective international engagement to replace the haphazard dynamics that persist in transitioning countries within and beyond the Arab world.

Internationals were immediately interested when Tunisia suddenly opened. They also had ample reason to respond in a way that reflected their own lessons learned – from Central America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Southern Africa in the 1990s, to West Africa, South East Asia, Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s. But providing well-structured, organised expertise has proven difficult – and in ways all too familiar.

IFIT studied Tunisia's experience with media, security sector and judicial reforms and youth employment. These are readily recognisable policy sectors that both nationals and internationals identified as priorities early in the country's transition. Developing a clear picture of dynamics within these sectors was nevertheless difficult, since international assistance efforts in each one overlapped with the broader fields of democracy, development, and rule of law. Yet the reported net effect was consistent: most Tunisians find the international influx confusing and, at times, overwhelming.

While positive results for the transition have been achieved, disenchantment in the national-international relationship is emerging as disagreements surface about basic questions of responsibility, coordination, priorities and needs. There is a common feeling that changes achieved across the four sectors have not been proportional to the time and resources invested. Anxiety is increasing as nationals, and many of their international NGO partners, face an inevitable decline in donor funding and activity. Yet, both sides can take simple steps to maximise remaining good-will. Variations on the coordination model recently adopted in the media sector can be replicated in the other three, less-coordinated sectors. Mapping can be done of international experts in other areas of transitional priority.

Problems identified in Tunisia through this research can also help guide measures that target systemic problems in the international response to transitions. A one-stop transition information portal could become an early, funded international task for every democratic or post-conflict transition. A transition preparedness guide for national actors could help them get the best from the international expert assistance machine when it arrives. A voluntary set of international principles to improve the quality of cross-border expertise is also needed and feasible.

The window of opportunity for building the foundation of a more democratic and just Tunisia, and the corresponding support on offer from internationals, remain open. With some simple adjustments in approach, the country can still become a showcase for the international community's delivery of expertise and lessons on effective transitional policymaking.

Introduction

Transitions out of authoritarian rule have been the subject of decades of study. Less studied is the flow of international expert assistance into transitional societies. This report, based on extensive field research and in-country interviews, looks through the window of Tunisia's transition after two years to assess the dynamics and consequences of this flow as they relate to selected national policy priorities and, potentially more broadly, to other transitional societies.[1]

The revolt in January 2011 against the regime of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali occurred at a mature moment in global thinking about transitions. Based on important debates among academics and practitioners – grounded in hard lessons from places such as the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan – a healthy "transition Realpolitik" had emerged.[2] This Realpolitik has numerous premises. It recognises democratic openings as deeply political processes, not merely technocratic exercises. It views transitions not as a brief, singular period in time with a predictable arc, but instead as the first of a succession of critical junctures through which a country can reform and modernise. It also recognises that transitions, particularly in their earliest years, are fundamentally social contract-formation moments – among a state's citizens; between the state and its citizens; and between the state, its neighbours and the broader international community. Such new perspectives stimulated talk of a "second-generation" approach to external assistance for reform processes and transitions, premised on better local context knowledge and fewer formulas.[3]

The Tunisian transition thus arose at a relatively advanced moment in global thinking about transitions when there was reason to expect more from the outside world. The transition's inherent conditions gave reason for further optimism. Unlike South American countries, Tunisia was not emerging from a military dictatorship in which civilians had to wrest democracy from an all-powerful army. In contrast to Central and Eastern European states, it did not require transition from a communist to a market economy, nor overturning a totalitarian system that controlled almost every aspect of public and private life. Unlike South Africa's transition, Tunisia's was not negotiated at the barrel of a gun, nor infused with deep racial and ethnic cleavages capable of sparking civil war. Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, its transition was the fruit of internal revolt rather than outside intervention. Just as importantly, the country's interim government adopted a structured roadmap for transition, transparently communicating election plans for a Constituent Assembly, elected in October 2011, that would draft the constitution and presage a more permanent form of rule-based, democratic governance.

Other structural characteristics were less favourable. The surrounding region offered no obvious Arab democratic model and few Arabic-speaking transition experts on whom to call for advice. Tunisia had no significant experience with political pluralism. It also faced challenges common to societies emerging from authoritarian rule: dysfunctional state institutions, a fragile economy, embryonic civil society, under-developed media, a legacy of gross human rights violations and an uncoordinated donor community.

The country nevertheless provided a generally constructive atmosphere for the transmission of international expertise. A compact, middle-income country with a small population, settled

borders and no history of mass internecine violence, Tunisia presented internationals with refreshingly few obstacles. Embassies, multilateral agencies, international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and consulting firms recognised this and began organising conferences and developing projects there early in 2011.

Tunisia adopted an open-door approach to foreign expertise, making it widely perceived as the "most welcoming" Arab Spring country for international activities.[4] Government officials and local civil society groups alike were eager for foreign advice and lessons from other transitions. An accommodating regulatory structure made it reasonably easy for foreign NGOs to set up.[5] This contrasted with Egypt and Libya, where establishing offices and outreach programs proved far more challenging. Tunisia quickly became a convenient base of regional operations for many international organisations. What began as a trickle of expert help to the transition became a flood.

Despite having a larger class of skilled professionals than many of its regional neighbours, absorption capacity was limited. Unlike countries in Central America, South East Asia and Central Africa, Tunisia lacked experience with a large and varied international presence when its transition began. It was accustomed to tourism but not the frenzy of so many foreigners and international agencies simultaneously setting up shop, arranging long-term rentals, hiring staff, offering funds, organising events and generally being omnipresent. Though at first the landscape was exhilarating, that feeling began to wane. With high expectations for reform, comparatively limited transitional achievements and increasing political and economic polarisation, many Tunisians soon wondered how much the sudden influx was benefiting them. Doubts were not only voiced on the national side. Dimmed expectations also produced scepticism among internationals about the country's political will and capacity for change. Political obstruction is seen as a major problem by many in local civil society as well.

While not inevitable, such sentiments are typical in transitions. The gap between expectations and results in the first phase often dampens the optimism of nationals and internationals alike. Structural aspects of the national-international relationship – especially its ephemeral, inherently lopsided nature – are also responsible. As a window into the dynamics of this relationship, Tunisia presents an illuminating case study. As the first modern Arab state to experience a successful revolt against dictatorship and the one considered most likely to have a positive regional demonstration effect, Tunisia's transition – and what it teaches about expert assistance flows – is relevant to others within and beyond the Arab world.

This report examines the role of cross-border expert assistance in relation to four priorities of the transition: media reform, security sector reform, judicial reform and youth employment. It maps the main actors identified by respondents in each of these and reflects the dominant views expressed by Tunisian and international policymakers, social leaders and academics. Each of these areas is a high priority for nationals and internationals working on the transition and will continue as such for the foreseeable future. Each also has identifiable boundaries as a platform of international expert assistance. It was this combination of factors – and not an assumption of paramountcy to other policy priorities – that guided IFIT's choice to focus on these sectors as windows into the dynamics of international expert assistance.[6]

The report's first section addresses general patterns in the international-national dynamic that surfaced across all four sectors. More specific, sector-by-sector manifestations are then considered. The report concludes with observations and recommendations relevant to Tunisia and beyond. It does not examine the so-called international "aid rush" of donors, or the dynamics of

domestic Tunisian politics, except as directly related to the provision of international technical assistance in the selected areas.[7]

The answers sought in this research were multifaceted but the questions posed were simple. Has the right kind of international expertise been reaching local decision-makers and civil society leaders, or has the support been disorganised and distracting? To what extent are internationals' projects being driven by on-the-ground demands as opposed to externally-driven objectives? How do Tunisians feel about the accessibility, content and quantity of international expertise?

The answers to these and similar questions have immense practical consequences. The outcome of Tunisia's transition remains uncertain. When this moment ends, and the experts leave, Tunisians and internationals alike will want to ensure they did not miss the opportunity to help put in place the building blocks for the progress demanded in the country's historic revolt.

General Patterns of International Expert Assistance

The world of international expert assistance in transitional countries defies simple description. To give a basic idea of its scale and complexity, we can imagine a single European state from which expert assistance may be delivered by government ministries (aid, foreign affairs, trade, defence), parliamentary bodies and the local embassy, as well as numerous national think-tanks, specialised NGOs, universities, private firms, professional associations, trade unions, religious bodies, media outlets and individual researchers and consultants. Among developed countries, we can multiply this example by several dozen then add multilateral bodies (from the large UN family and a wide range of regional organisations) as well as transnational actors and emerging economic powers with potentially divergent interests. This large array is present today, in varying degrees, at the onset of a political transition – especially in a case like Tunisia, around which justified hopes arose and into which expertise was able to move freely.

When the internationals arrived in Tunisia, the unprepared population had to find its own way to navigate the labyrinth of specialised actors and transitional policy sectors of which media, security and judicial reform and youth employment are but four examples. As usual, the playing field was uneven. Arriving internationals often bring accumulated experience (and biases) from working in other contexts, while nationals tend to be newer to the "game". The inherently unnatural relationship – one side provides, the other receives – also affects interactions. Though friendships form, relationships of trust arise and funds are shared, there is a fundamental "dependency premise" that can never be fully undone. Moral hazard is present as well: among internationals who dip in and out of transitions a tendency to "take less care" in context analysis and service delivery can easily arise, as mistakes' costs are borne primarily by the intended beneficiaries.[8]

With such structural dynamics at play, relations become complicated and confusion is understandable. Those on the receiving end of expert assistance tend to feel overwhelmed by the innumerable, well-intentioned actors who request meetings, compile diagnostic reports, host seminars, conduct training workshops and offer advice. Tunisia offered no exception – though interviewees expressed gratitude for some of the technical assistance they individually received

and confidence that many intentions were bona fide. Frustration and confusion were, nevertheless, the dominant sentiments voiced – a reflection of direct experiences but also of a perceived "chaotic" general atmosphere and "non-stop" docket of conferences, training and meetings. "We've been inundated", said one Tunisian. "There are so many organisations coming and going – it's impossible to keep track of it all".[9]

Drawing on over 250 in-country interviews conducted for this report between November 2012 and March 2013, ten general patterns of national-international relations emerged. These concerned the quantity, content, format, duration, coordination, tempo, sites, access, commitment and candour of expert assistance. This thematic breakdown arose naturally from the research. Yet, the research could not tell the full picture. While leading actors in the four sectors were interviewed, others less active or more tangentially engaged in the sectors were not. International and national interviewees alike could rarely provide anything close to a comprehensive list of those involved in their sector, let alone in overlapping sectors such as transitional justice (in the case of judicial and security sector reform), education reform (in the case of youth employment) or democracy aid (in the case of media reform). The consistency of responses, however, suggests the general patterns described below would be unlikely to vary.

Quantity: how much international expert assistance is Tunisia receiving?

Tunisians interviewed in each of the four policy sectors routinely expressed feelings of being deluged by international involvement. For many, international interest came in the form of an "avalanche" or a "feeding frenzy".[10] Large numbers of actors – including aid agencies, NGO workers, independent researchers, journalists and consultants – descended into Tunisia to conduct interviews, studies, meetings, training seminars and more. International presence and activity have grown steadily since 2011. At one hotel alone, there were over 50 major conferences in 2012, the majority of which were on transitional policy issues.[11]

Many Tunisians struggle to keep track of these activities and have difficulty juggling the torrent of interest with their demanding jobs. "In the first months of the revolution we'd have ten to fifteen people interview us every day", said Ramy Salhi, regional manager of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders, a regional NGO. "Some organisations started saying 'no' – not because they didn't want the dialogue, but because they just didn't have the time".[12] A member of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, a women's rights NGO, noted that the internationals "all came to us after the revolution. We had no energy to receive more".[13]

Content: how tailored and relevant is the policy content of international expertise in Tunisia?

Most national respondents across the four sectors perceived the various forms of assistance as insufficiently customised to meet the specifics of their historical, institutional and cultural context. They stressed that internationals tended to come with a "pre-fabricated box of solutions" based on superficial diagnoses of the country.[14] "These experts are very knowledgeable in their own fields", said a Constituent Assembly member, "but they usually come with absolutely no idea of our social or political landscape".[15] One respondent told of an international workshop organiser who asked if Tunisia had an active labour union, though its Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) has played a major role in the country's modern history.[16] Some internationals countered that Tunisia had been largely closed to global civil society activists and opened quickly and unexpectedly, so in the first post-revolution weeks little context knowledge was to be expected.

Local respondents noted that prioritisation of issues and country comparisons were often problematic as well. Many – particularly those living in the interior – perceived internationals as focusing too much on political and legal issues (eg, democracy awareness, constitution-building and women's rights) at the expense of economic marginalisation, a central grievance that led to Ben Ali's ouster. "It's either that they have a plan to promote this same 'democracy' agenda [across the Middle East] or they don't know how important the economy and better education are to us", said a civil society activist from Gabes.[17] Frustration with talks and training sessions that seemed to uncritically lump Tunisia's challenges with Libya's and Egypt's were also frequently expressed. "We primarily compare ourselves to southern Europe, not to these countries, but for them we are all just Arabs", remarked a local academic.[18]

A number of respondents went so far as to attribute the lack of tailored assistance to indifference or, at times, arrogance. Internationals, however, noted that adapting comparative lessons to the local context requires guidance from national partners. Because the revolution came suddenly in a country that had been isolated from outside NGOs, little brainstorming about a "Tunisian transition strategy" had been done before the revolution. This complicated internationals' ability to deliver customised, demand-driven assistance.

Format: is the international expert assistance in Tunisia being delivered by effective means?

Tunisian respondents identified major problems with the delivery mode of expertise, including language barriers, "event overload" and unhelpful structuring of training.

Respondents identified language as one of the most obvious and important obstacles. The overwhelming majority of internationally-organised conferences, seminars and, to a lesser extent, training workshops are in French – a language few Tunisians outside elite coastal communities have fully mastered. English is also common in training workshops, in which case translators are present. Yet even with simultaneous translation, certain messages do not get through. "People come with English-language PowerPoint presentations – the same ones they used in other countries all over the world", said Hechmi M'nasri, a microenterprise expert in Gafsa. "There's a massive need to adapt solutions to the people".[19] A further obstacle is that most democratic transitions literature exists only in English, much less is in French, and hardly any in Arabic. Although some translations have been made, Tunisians noted that they typically take the form of short leaflets distributed at internationally-sponsored events.

Scheduling represented another source of frustration for many. Event times often conflict with busy work-day schedules, as many activists rely on full-time positions for their livelihoods and perform public interest activities on a volunteer basis. "They didn't realise that many of us have serious jobs", noted a Tunisian professor and human rights trainer. "A lot of events were continuously scheduled at inconvenient times, and this is still going on".[20] Tunisian respondents recommended that internationals devote much more energy to developing meaningful mentorship programs than organising large-group trainings and conferences. "We're experiencing 'talk inflation' on the part of internationals and Tunisians now", said Akram Belhaj Rhouma, an adviser to the Employment Minister.[21]

While respondents praised some of the individual events and training, there was concern that certain internationally-sponsored opportunities, such as conferences at five-star Tunisian hotels and study-abroad tours, might be strengthening patronage networks. Interviewees in various ministries reported that international organisations sometimes gave senior officials full responsibility

to select delegates for important national events and foreign travel. The problem, they said, is that officials can use these opportunities to reward friends or win allegiances. "The bureaucratic culture here views these training programs and trips as gifts, not tools", said one official, echoing the frustrations of colleagues.[22] Others expressed disappointment with the lack of knowledge some training participants brought back. They recommended that internationals work to develop better evaluative and follow-up mechanisms.

Duration: is the duration of international expert assistance in Tunisia adequate?

Tunisians and internationals alike noted that cross-border assistance often takes the form of "hit-and-run" engagements rather than long-term programs and partnership building. "There are a lot of one-off events – diagnostic reports, seminars and so on – but we don't see nearly enough sustained engagement and follow-up", a judge in Tunis said, reflecting the views of most local interviewees.[23] Many Tunisian policymakers and civil society leaders spoke resignedly of internationals' transitory involvement, as if it were a routine part of life in the new Tunisia. "*Yijiyu wa yimshiyu*" – "they [the internationals] come, and they go" – was one of the most common refrains voiced during interviews. Internationals, conscious of the perception, sometimes justified short-term engagement as a natural response to a historical and potentially narrow window for reform. It is understandable, they said, that internationals of all stripes would rush to seize the opportunity by contributing quick assistance, however brief in duration. It is also in the nature of international engagement, they noted, that only a minority of experts is able or willing to relocate to a new country for long periods.

Internationals whose funding relies on project-based government grants and private foundation support also blamed budgeting perversities, saying that donors' short-term funding horizons and vacillating priorities make it nearly impossible to plan long-term engagements. Organisations with larger and steadier funding have had more leeway to plan multi-year projects. Off-the-record comments by many practitioners indicated competition among NGOs and embassies as yet another cause of "short-termism". Donors and organisations frequently race to "plant their flags" and enhance their reputations by rolling out quick, high-visibility programs and events that attract publicity but contribute little, they noted.

Coordination: is international expert assistance being effectively coordinated?

Some small attempts at informal coordination have been relatively successful, particularly among actors of similar size with specific, overlapping activities. This is the case for media reform, and to a lesser degree, police training. There are, however, few large and successful attempts at formal coordination in most other areas, with the possible exception of the related field of transitional justice.[24] Many Tunisians were eager to cite entire lists of redundant, quick-succession international studies, overlapping training sessions and nearly identical conferences. "I can't tell you how many different groups have come back and forth, making various studies", said one member of the Tunisian League for Human Rights, a local NGO. "Internationals don't share their reports effectively, and they certainly don't make harmonious delivery of assistance a priority".[25]

Internationals recognised coordination as an important objective but noted that it cannot succeed if it is an extra responsibility on top of a regular job. A full-time coordinator position needs to be funded and filled, since coordination efforts within any sector absorb much time and energy.

There are, however, structural disincentives: actors within a sector may be unwilling to take on the burden of coordination, knowing that they will not retain a greater portion of the collective benefit than others. Institutional competition – for funding, visibility and local partners – is another factor militating against coordination according to many respondents.

Access: are Tunisians able to effectively procure the international expert assistance on offer?

According to many Tunisian civil society groups, finding and navigating opportunities for international technical assistance is a great challenge. Information is scattered in each of the four policy sectors. It exists on websites of NGOs and embassies, but is often buried deep in partnership initiative pages that are sometimes written only in English and unsearchable through Google in French or Arabic. Tunisian interviewees also observed that internationals too often neglect to publicise assistance opportunities on the platforms they use, such as Facebook and Twitter (for those with regular Internet access) and radio or newspapers (for the many without stable Internet). "They expect civil society to know they're helping them", said Hosni Mouelhi of Foundation for the Future, a regional foundation supporting civil society in Tunisia. "It's as if I have a corporate proposal but just leave it on my desk, expecting people to somehow come in and read it".[26]

Older and better-networked NGOs in the capital have less difficulty accessing assistance. For younger organisations or those outside the Tunis loop, however, accessing the world of training, seminars and events can pose a major challenge. "This is an uphill struggle", said Ibtihel Abdellatif, president and founder of Tunisian Women, a local NGO that compiles dossiers about women who suffered police abuse under the old regime. "We are working hard every day, but it is difficult to become visible and find good opportunities".[27] According to Mouheb Garaoui, a founding member of the youth-run organisation I-WATCH, "networking with internationals and older Tunisian NGOs can be really difficult, but I think we were lucky; most of our members speak English, and we are in Tunis, so it is easy for us to have lunch with the internationals. I also think being trained in proposal writing in English can really help".[28]

Internationals expressed interest in scouting for new organisations and expanding access to expert assistance outside the capital, but most have busy schedules and acknowledged they end up mainly interacting with those they already know. They considered it largely natural that some Tunisians will be better networked in the international system depending on where they live, how well they speak French or English, and the breadth and quality of their contacts.

Tempo: how well-timed is the roll-out of international assistance?

Tunisians in the capital, particularly civil society leaders, generally felt that international expert assistance flowed into the country on the right topics at the right moments. Internationals gave extensive expert support in the run-up to the October 2011 elections and have provided equally vigorous assistance during the constitutional drafting process (2012-2013), which intersects with the four policy areas examined here.

Reactions differed outside affluent Tunis neighbourhoods, especially in the south-central provinces of Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, and Kasserine. Residents there expressed frustration that, in the first period of the transition, internationals appeared to neglect more urgent issues such as regional decentralisation and youth unemployment in favour of "abstract" constitutional debates in Tunis. Internationals noted, however, that such issues are not tied to a time-sensitive political

calendar in the same way as elections or drafting a constitution – issues whose deferral would, in their view, exact more far-reaching costs on the transition.

Sites: is the international expert assistance well-directed across different parts of Tunisia?

As in any transition, the location of international engagement is an important dimension of technical assistance. In Tunisia, most international experts and activities are concentrated in the capital, where the main national policymakers are based. It was unsurprising to discover that many of the dynamics and difficulties described here in general terms are more pronounced in the interior, where contact is less frequent and more transient.

Although many organisations have conducted one-off training workshops or sporadic tours in the south, sustained engagement in the interior remains rare. Sidi Bouzid, where a young fruit seller's suicide sparked the revolt against the old regime, remains a high-visibility destination for donors and experts. Authorities and NGOs in Gafsa and Kasserine, where massive strikes have called attention to economic inequality, also receive a limited amount of international expert help. But other towns, particularly deep in the south (like Gabes and Tataouine) and the north west (eg, Jendouba, Le Kef, and Beja) receive little international outreach.

Leadership: who bears primary responsibility for directing international expert assistance?

Do nationals have the first responsibility to develop reform plans and coordination strategies, which internationals then respond to, or do internationals have an obligation to help draft such plans and begin spearheading coordination? This represents an important source of confusion between internationals and locals. Many Tunisian officials said they were initially unaware that internationals would predicate much of their help on the ministries developing detailed national reform strategies, or that they would be expected to bear direct responsibility for international coordination. The situation is unfamiliar, given the centralised direction and bureaucratic passivity that prevailed under Ben Ali. In the new democratic era, internationals generally expect relevant ministries to draw up national reform strategies as a first step, and assistance to be coordinated subsequently. This presents a challenge for ministries that are often more critically strapped for time than the internationals who seek to help them reform.

Ministries have prepared a spate of sectoral reform strategies, including on issues examined here.[29] Though such strategies have catalysed improved dynamics between nationals and internationals in some cases, the process has not been easy. For ministries deeply corroded by decades of authoritarian rule, efforts to engineer reforms and coordinate international engagement often overlapped with the need to address inherited institutional problems. Numerous ministries were reorganised in the first months of the transition, generating pressure, confusion and personal conflicts.[30] Retrieving lost or purposely hidden files, purging or repurposing corrupt staff, and restructuring departments absorbed significant institutional energy. Tunisian respondents also noted that, due to Ben Ali's heavy-handed legacy, many ministries lacked habits of effective policymaking and outreach.[31] "The government as a whole has a problem with communication", said Alya Bettaïeb, Secretary of State for the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation. "But this is natural when you consider the extent to which Ben Ali intentionally suffocated external dialogue and cut channels of communication between the ministries".[32]

Commitment: does the international assistance reflect a commitment to historical change?

The vast majority of Tunisian respondents raised concern that internationals do not share their feelings of ownership, obligation to, and passion for the country's historic moment. "You have to be realistic", said one official. "It may be history for us, but it's just a job for them".[33] They also voiced frustration that internationals tend to base themselves in the Lac district and other expensive Tunis suburbs, renting apartments that often cost five times the average monthly wage and appearing to spend lavishly on organisational activities. Though many named actors they considered exceptions, the dominant perception was that internationals seem divorced from local realities – part of a "machine" that often "places its self-interest above Tunisians' interests".[34]

Candour: does the national-international dynamic allow for transparent working relations?

Local respondents – particularly those working in ministries or organisations that receive funding from aid agencies and embassies – expressed an inability to share candid criticisms with internationals and decline help. Though "partnership" is a much-used term in the world of international expert assistance, relationships, as noted, are inherently unnatural and uneven. The added element of funding insecurity further complicates the relationship.

Interviews with Tunisians revealed that saying "no" to international experts can be difficult for reasons besides money. Experts arrive into Tunisia's uncertain context with an aura of reliability and calm, holding Western degrees and titles from respected institutions. Seeking advice and accepting meetings from such persons can seem logical, even obligatory. "This is a time when we genuinely need outside expertise, and we are open", said an Employment Ministry official, "but we have to communicate our needs, and we cannot do that when we see them, and they see themselves, as helpers and us as the 'helpees'".[35]

Sectoral Patterns of Expert Assistance

Having described the cross-sectoral patterns and dynamics of international expert assistance, this section moves from the general to the particular. It analyses specific manifestations of the broader patterns in the areas of media, security sector and judicial reform and youth employment.

MEDIA REFORM

Context into which International Expert Assistance Arrived

Prior to the ouster of President Ben Ali, Tunisia's media was one of the most muted and censored in the region. Outlets were mostly controlled by his cronies and flattered the regime instead of holding it accountable. Some bloggers wrote critically on the Internet, but mainstream media – represented by national broadcast networks, newspapers and radio stations – was largely docile.

Openly criticising the regime frequently resulted in personal harassment and economic intimidation, or imprisonment and torture in the worst cases. Most journalists did not dare overstep their bounds. Unlike in the former Soviet bloc, there was not a massive, organised underground movement of dissident writers or press.

In this general atmosphere of unpreparedness, a host of new media sprang up early in the country's transition. New television channels like TNN and Tounsia, which often feature political debates and satirical programs, became popular. Formerly music-only radio stations began airing news and political talk shows. Despite corruption allegations surrounding some of the most successful media magnates, Tunisians generally appear to value this dynamic new atmosphere of expression and debate. In polls, they consistently rank "freedom of expression" as a top priority for the country and express concern about any encroachments.[36]

A number of official steps have been taken to delink media from state control. The interim government that ran the country for most of 2011 issued two important legislative decrees related to media freedom: Decree 115, which outlines a new press code, and Decree 116, which calls for creation of a High Independent Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA). Once created, HAICA will be Tunisia's first truly independent media regulatory commission. The interim government also created the National Authority for the Reform of Information and Communication (INRIC). INRIC members published an official report and proposals in April 2012 but resigned in protest at perceived government inaction.[37]

On the whole, Tunisia's media sector remains fragile and fraught with challenges. According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, journalists "continue to operate without appropriate resources and training, and often under questionable professional standards".[38] Subjective reporting, hearsay, and tabloid-style attack journalism clutter the airwaves and newsstands. Investigative journalism and specialised reporting are comparatively rare. Outlets, many of which the regime had engineered for complicity, not efficiency, are struggling to craft sustainable business models and effective management.

The sector is nevertheless asserting itself as a major new voice in political debate, even as it sometimes seeks absolute independence from state control. Civil society organisations have developed a new two-way relationship with the media, learning how to coordinate essential activities like press releases, press conferences and other means to publicise their messages. Many state ministries are learning to do the same. Yet, the government, as one would expect in any new democracy – but especially in the context of an Islamist-party-dominated government and secular-dominated press – bridles at the dramatic increase in criticism. For some, this dynamic, in combination with lagging enforcement of the two decrees, has generated fear that prevailing media freedoms will be short-lived, and that government will reassert an undemocratic level of control and censorship.

Against this backdrop, the overall trajectory of international assistance to Tunisia's media sector has had three main stages. The first months after Ben Ali's departure saw intensive focus on training journalists to cover the October 2011 elections, the first truly free and fair national elections in Tunisia's history. The training was needed, many respondents said, even if it came suddenly and en masse. In 2012, internationals focused greater attention on converting state media into public media. In 2013, a new focus is emerging on citizen journalism and community radio.[39]

The chart in the Appendix presents those identified as the principal international and national actors involved in media reform. Nearly all the international actors are from developed countries,

and very few were present before the transition (though some worked on Tunisia from afar). Exceptions include the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, a German political foundation which built a presence in the 1960s and co-founded and maintained a relationship with the African Centre for Training of Journalists and Communicators (CAPJC), the Tunisian media training body; and IREX, an international NGO, which has been operating in Tunisia since 2010.

International-National Dynamics within the Sector

Tunisian media received considerable international help in the wake of Ben Ali's departure. International organisations prioritised media reform and found it more accessible than the other three sectors, whose sensitivity and highly specialised nature sometimes discouraged involvement.

Tunisians and internationals alike commented that a large influx of internationals and training programs "descended on Tunisia" in the first few months of the transition.[40] According to Olivia Gré of the international NGO Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), the assistance "came all at the same time and with little or no follow-up".[41] "The offer of training was overwhelming … much higher than the demand", said Abdelkarim Hizaoui, general director of CAPJC.[42] Some of the early opportunities, however – such as study tours to Eastern European countries that experienced media reform transitions years earlier – were mentioned positively.

Tunisian stakeholders sharply criticised the content of most media training. Many felt that internationals had simply "parachuted in" with standardised courses, rather than taken the time to understand the media's actual contours and needs – vague as they were in the beginning. Generating advertisement-based revenues, organising a newsroom and managing the editing process are the kinds of priorities considered most crucial by many local media. "It would be very useful to have training about how to write a business plan and how to move around in the advertising sector", said Zied Mhirsi, co-founder of the first English-language online news provider, Tunisia Live. "We cannot have a situation where unless there are public subsidies, the editors do not know how to run and do things".[43] The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom has taken steps toward providing more business-based training with its local partner, CAPJC. "We are putting more accent on economic aspects of the media, business models and how to ensure successful privatisation", said its resident representative, Alexander Knipperts.[44] Still, most international assistance providers in this sector are not yet offering business or managerial training.

Investigative journalism and media ethics are also seen as priorities. While some international organisations such as the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) already deliver such training, most Tunisians believe more is required. "We need more training in these areas", explained Abdelkarim Hizaoui of CAPJC, "because there are bad habits of simply sitting behind one's desk and copying the communiqué".[45] Many also indicated that training journalists should not be the sole focus, and that civil society and Constituent Assembly members would benefit, respectively, from expertise regarding media advocacy and comparative media legislation.

The language of journalistic seminars and training was commonly described as problematic. Approximately 80-90 per cent of Tunisian media is in Arabic, but an estimated 80 per cent of the training is in French.[46] Organisations like IWPR and the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), an international NGO serving the community radio movement, have made a point of hiring locals and regionals who speak Arabic. "We use two trainers, of which one must be an Arabic speaker", said Steve Buckley, former AMARC president.[47] Yet in the early months,

finding time to prepare many Arabic-speaking trainers was difficult, since needs across the region were high and foreign ministries and international NGOs generally lack Arabic speakers.

Tunisian respondents also lamented what they described as "classroom-style" talks that too often take place in fancy hotels, creating a perception of wasted money. They recommended that there be more partnership-oriented programs. "It is much better to have in situ coaching than lectures in hotels", said Bechir Ouarda, formerly a journalist at TAP (Agence Tunis Afrique Presse), the national press agency, and co-author of a major study of the Tunisian media. "Trainers should accompany our journalists by embedding themselves in editorial offices".[48] Tunisians in the media expressed interest in having internationals be exposed to local journalists' daily realities, which would enable them to deliver more tailored recommendations. There was also a call for more expert support outside Tunis and more effort to schedule trainings with editors, which could reduce absenteeism. Article 19, an international NGO focused on freedom of expression and information, already does much of its training outside Tunis. Others such as Fondation Hirondelle, a journalist-founded Swiss NGO, and Deutsche Welle Akademie, the German international media trainer, do similarly.

Some Tunisians expressed desire for training methods aimed at reducing dependency and mitigating the need for long-term international presence. "There should be more teachers' training", said one respondent. "For every five trained journalists there should be one trained trainer".[49] Though Deutsche Welle, BBC Media Action and France 2 have trained trainers, Tunisian interviewees indicated more is needed, particularly for TAP, whose agency and radio employ 80 per cent of all journalists. Yet finding funds for further training of trainers may prove increasingly difficult as available resources begin to diminish.

A highlight of media reform is the comparatively effective coordination of international technical assistance. Unlike the other sectors, it has a single, clearly recognised framework: the Group of Technical and Financial Partners in Support of the Tunisian Media Sector, an initiative of the Belgian-Walloon aid agency. Now supported by the Swiss embassy, its sole purpose is to coordinate international media reform. The manager of the group, Alexandre Delvaux, began convening monthly coordination meetings for donors, embassies and implementers in October 2012. The group came too late to avoid some redundancy problems associated with the first year of assistance, but it is well known and generally appreciated. It maintains a website where internationals can upload their projects and keep tabs on one another's activities and on developments within the media sector.[50] The intention is to eventually have a Tunisian, rather than an international, steer the group.

Despite this coordination, Tunisian respondents felt that duplication of efforts remains common. They complained that media training sessions too often repeated content and were sometimes unproductive diversions.[51] Larbi Chouika, an instructor with the Institute of Press & Information Sciences (IPSI), Tunisia's public body charged with the training of information and media professionals, said near-constant training "distracts journalists from their real jobs", which involve deadlines.[52] Also, the opportunities do not appear evenly spread. The National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) has received little help aside from some mentoring by Institut Panos Paris, an international NGO supporting pluralism in the media. This may be due to the politically-oriented nature of some of the union's activities. "For now there is no institutional funding given to the SNJT, and they need it badly", noted Marwan Maalouf, head of IWPR in Tunisia.[53]

Initially abundant, training sessions and workshops for bloggers have waned. "There were a lot of fluffy strategies and activities in 2011, like blogging workshops and 'democracy awareness'

conferences", said Kerim Bouzouita, an ex-blogger and web journalism instructor. "But a lot of those events were more about taking photos with Tunisian bloggers than crafting a mobilising vision for media reform".[54] Caroline Vuillemin, Chief Operations Officer at Fondation Hirondelle, which runs a project to support Tunisia's national radio, shared a similar view: "Doing blogging training was sexy for the donors. It looked innovative and creative to them, but it wasn't responsive to needs on the ground".[55] According to Alexandre Delvaux, "there first was a focus on bloggers … then HAICA became the new thing internationals were willing to throw money at even though HAICA does not exist yet and it is unclear what it would do with the money if it did exist …. International financial and technical assistance should not be based on a pre-determined project".[56]

As the focus of media reform enters a new phase, internationals increasingly look to Tunisians to take the lead in the relationship and identify the expertise and assistance required. This may take some time. International experts noted that – perhaps on account of dependencies produced by the first two years of the transition – many Tunisian media actors still tend to wait to be approached.

Proposed Adjustments in Sector

- More on-site mentorships. Less training in hotels. Fewer one-off seminars and conferences.
- More specialised training: eg, economic, investigative and parliamentary reporting.
- More focus on professional elements: eg, managerial issues, business models and media ethics.
- More training of trainers, using the best local journalists to train others.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Context into which International Expert Assistance Arrived

Unlike Algeria and Egypt, where the military has frequently determined political outcomes, Tunisia's post-colonial leaders sidelined the army, relying almost exclusively on internal security forces – in particular the police and National Guard.[57] Their purpose was "to protect the regime, not the population".[58] During the 1990s and 2000s, the Interior Ministry (henceforth the ministry), which controls the police and National Guard, oversaw the arrest, imprisonment and torture of thousands whose religious or political views threatened President Ben Ali. It became the country's most-loathed institution. More than two years into the transition, the ministry's blockish grey building on the main avenue of downtown Tunis remains encircled by barbed wire to keep frequent protesters at bay.

International efforts to reform the security forces have centred mainly on reforming the ministry. Because of its central role in enforcing the worst of the old abuses, however, reforms have come slowly. Obtaining information about its internal structures and operations was impossible under Ben Ali and remains very difficult. "The Ministry of Interior has been acting like a black box for decades", said Bassem Bouguerra, founder of Tunisian Institutional Reform (TIR), a civil society body that combats police violence. "It's in the interest of everyone there to keep that black box solid".[59] Few Tunisians, and even fewer internationals, possess a detailed understanding of the ministry's organisation. This often stops reform and assistance projects before they start. Certain international actors, including from the EU, stressed that they cannot pursue major initiatives with the ministry until a detailed peer review of its organs and internal functions has been conducted.[60]

The ministry underwent a quick succession of changes early in the transition. The political police were dissolved and enhanced efforts were made to improve communication with ordinary people. Ali Laarayedh – who was tortured in the ministry's basement for ten years on account of his involvement in the formerly banned Islamist party Ennahda – was appointed minister in January 2012, and held the position until February 2013, when he was named prime minister. Yet under Laarayedh the institution changed little. "The head of the pyramid changed", said a member of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has worked extensively on the security sector, "but the rest of the ministry is from the old regime".[61] Tensions have simmered between members of the government who often suffered at the hands of internal security forces and those who worked in the ministry pre-revolution. Combined with ad hoc staff reshuffles and a partially disrupted chain of command, these tensions contribute to a sense that the ministry has become "more disorganised".[62]

Problematic old laws like no. 4 of 1969, which allows police to fire indiscriminately on crowds, are another concern. So too is the need to replace Tunisia's networks of secret informants with an ethical, professional and responsible police. Public trust depends on these and other reforms in the sector, as Tunisians worry that impunity and weak security may threaten the transition. Violent episodes, such as the September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis and the assassination in February 2013 of Chokri Belaïd, a prominent leftist politician and vocal critic of Ennahda, have inspired new outrage against the government, intensifying pressure on the ministry to reform.

Continued tensions within the ministry and unrest across the country have seemingly pushed comprehensive reform of the sector to the back burner, however. As noted by Jonas Loetscher, a security specialist at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), an international foundation working on security sector governance: "It is hard to look at long-term reform strategies if you have a fire under the roof".[63] While there are signs the sector is reforming – including new uniforms for police, human rights training for recruits and a small but increasingly visible number of security-focused local NGOs – major challenges remain.

A cluster of international expertise exists to support the sector's reform, focusing principally on the Ministry of Interior. The chart in the Appendix lists those identified by interviewees as the main international and national actors. As with media reform, the bulk of international experts are from the developed world, and until the country's transition, few worked there on security sector reform (hereafter SSR).

International-National Dynamics within the Sector

Unlike the media sector, the security sector has not experienced a glut of international actors. There are at least two explanations: SSR's specialised nature, and stricter regulations on international involvement. The paradox is that the potential range of needed reforms is immense. Comprehensive SSR can include constitutional and legislative reforms, new codes of conduct, census and identification procedures, vetting programs, elimination of outdated or unfixable departments or units, revised law enforcement training, symbolic changes of insignia, new tenure and promotion rules, and education of the public on its rights vis-à-vis law enforcement.[64]

This research revealed a perception that few international organisations possess the know-how to meaningfully engage on security issues in Tunisia. SSR experts are, as one specialist noted, "rare spices".[65] The in-depth expertise and long-term commitment necessary to interact productively with the Ministry of Interior make the sector particularly resistant to generic or episodic engagement.

Besides a number of bilateral engagements focused primarily on equipment provision, nearly all international engagement with the security sector has taken the form of technical advice given bilaterally to the Ministry of Interior, or training programs for police and law enforcement officials organised through it (as Tunisian law requires).[66] DCAF, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and OHCHR have provided confidential expertise to the ministry since the start of the transition and have led police training in conjunction with UNESCO and the International Francophone Network for Police Training (FRANCOPOL).

In the confusion following Ben Ali's ouster and creation of an interim government, some actors "promised more than they could provide", according to one ministry official.[67] Eventually it became clear that only five institutions (UNESCO, the ICRC, FRANCOPOL, OHCHR, and DCAF) could deliver modern SSR and police training programs suited to Tunisia. "Everyone tries to do everything in transitions, and some things end up falling between the chairs", said Joseph Schechla, former OHCHR representative in Tunisia. "It's hard to get something like police training going if you don't have the knowledge and programs in place".[68] An additional complicating factor is the atmosphere within the ministry itself: though its doors are "creaking open", access to information and personnel remains limited.[69]

The often confidential nature of discussions generated at training events, combined with the fact that many police training sessions are in mid-course, made interviewing large numbers of law enforcement officials difficult. But those officials interviewed – including current or former ministry staff and police in the National Union of Tunisian Security Forces Syndicates (UNSFST) – described training as "important", "critically needed" and "very helpful".[70] It has covered issues ranging from interaction with journalists to international conventions on human rights, and has targeted both police trainers and recruits.

Figures within the ministry were more ambivalent about the quality of the private advice they receive. They expressed particular respect for DCAF, ICRC and OHCHR, widely perceived as "specialist" organisations well suited to working on delicate issues in the ministry. "They are doing steady work on relevant problems", said Habib Essid, Minister of the Interior until late 2011.[71] In contrast, a ministry official said, "there's a feeling that the [other] internationals come, take part of the data, then go. They offer little to no useful advice".[72] Another commented: "We are especially annoyed with stillborn projects; some of the organisations that started projects here did not have the will or capacity to carry through. They could not meet the needs of this transitional period. These [unrealised projects] were a waste of time".[73]

Some ministry officials criticised the predilection for pre-packaged models of assistance based more on suppositions than actual needs. "We need people who first understand what already exists in Tunisia. They need to understand our specific capacities", said one.[74] Others noted that some SSR actors, especially multilateral ones, attempt to impose boilerplate codes of ethics on the ministry instead of updating pre-existing Tunisian codes: "It's as if I tell you to wear a vest because I have a factory producing vests", said a ministry official.[75] Yet internationals, already constrained by the ministry's opacity, often criticise it for a corollary failure: repeatedly giving the same, "stiff" PowerPoint presentation, which they frequently characterised as a "shopping list" including a €40 million request for equipment.[76]

SSR's uniquely sensitive challenges make long-term engagement indispensable. While it is too early to know whether current international engagements will endure, civil society actors and internationals noted that the ministry is less inclined to collaboration and tends to feel more "self-sufficient".[77] "The need is for 'less and longer' when it comes to Tunisian security reform. These

are sensitive issues, and trust is very important in this part of the world. The personal contacts and trust internationals put into their programs will really condition the success of those programs", said Jean-Michel Monod, ICRC's regional director.[78]

Although comprehensive sector-wide coordination of international efforts does not exist, OHCHR informally manages efforts among the five actors on police training to avoid duplication. UNESCO trains police on relations with journalists, ICRC delivers training on international humanitarian law, FRANCOPOL does community police training, OHCHR handles human rights training, and DCAF conducts communications training. Internationals stressed that coordinating the content and flow of their response is, however, primarily the responsibility of national actors. As one expressed it, "if you want to play a good symphony, the maestro should be the Tunisian side".[79]

The ministry did hold an international coordination meeting in September 2012. Yet according to internationals, it has since appeared hesitant to coordinate their involvement. Some suggested this may be because the ministry feels it gains more from dealing bilaterally than providing a platform for internationals to potentially "gang up" on it. Whether it will organise further coordination meetings is unclear – yet however the ministry acts, it cannot be circumvented. It is perceived as the narrow gate through which all SSR assistance must flow and, accordingly, efforts to assist the security sector remain concentrated on official engagement with it. In their work with the ministry, specialised actors like DCAF and OHCHR emphasise "strategic sequencing", arguing against a scattered "everything-at-once" approach to reform.[80]

For Tunisian NGOs active in SSR – the majority of which sprung up after the transition – the ministry-centric approach appears short-sighted. They criticise international organisations for "exclusionary" bilateral engagement that puts little pressure on the ministry to interact with Tunisian NGOs.[81] Many of these local organisations—including the Tunisian League for Human Rights, the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia and the Organisation against Torture in Tunisia – provide high-quality information about the context of police abuse, prison conditions, and victims' experiences. Yet they have struggled to develop horizontal partnerships with one another and to advocate effectively with the ministry.[82] "All of them – the EU, the UN organisations, everyone – have focused on working directly with the ministry. They should use their 'friendship' with the government to ask for civil society involvement", said Sihem Ben Sedrine, director of the Tunis Centre for Transitional Justice, a local NGO.[83] Bassem Bouguerra of TIR similarly called for internationals to foster more broad-based collaboration. "We believe pressure from the outside could be bigger than pressure from the inside …. If anything is needed today, it is the creation of a network of security reformers".[84]

Yet, further progress on reforms to the security sector reform may also depend on achieving greater clarity about lead responsibility between internationals and nationals. Internationals claim the absence of a comprehensive reform strategy has held back much of the financial and expert assistance that could be available to the ministry. While they acknowledged that it had drafted a plan, they considered its objectives hazy. "International support to SSR in Tunisia needs to be fully aligned with national reform strategies", noted Jonas Loetscher of DCAF. "Yet, this requires that strategies are clearly spelled out, that they combine institutional reforms with improving capacity at the operational level and that they have a sufficient level of detail. Such a plan would allow international actors to provide much more support".[85] Ministry officials, however, seem frustrated and often confused by international expectations. "First they say we have no reform strategy, and then we say 'yes we do, it's published on open sources'. Then they say we don't have specific projects, and then we say we do. Then they say 'no', we must do some studies here", said an

official.[86] "It's hard to know what they want sometimes", said another. "We hear so many different messages coming from all sides".[87]

Frustrations are mounting within the ministry. According to Mohamed Lazhar Akremi, former Deputy Minister of the Interior, "the Interior Ministry is a ministry of sovereignty" especially sensitive to outside intervention and criticism.[88] Individuals working inside it, particularly staff members who pre-date the transition, report that they increasingly feel besieged. Constant outside criticism, including by recently-formed security unions, is leading to defensiveness. Having held enormous power for decades, the ministry is struggling to build a new relationship with the outside world; accordingly internationals, especially DCAF, are focusing strategically on how to strengthen its internal and external communications. Progress is reflected in a weekly radio call-in show, "Le Forum de la Sécurité", in which a ministry representative and a member of DCAF jointly field audience questions. The ministry also has a highly visible but controversial spokesman, Khaled Tarrouche, who appears regularly on talk shows, radio programs and a Facebook page through which it updates the public.[89]

This joint outreach notwithstanding, the bulk of international expert groups and activities are centred in Tunis where the ministries of Interior, Justice, Human Rights and Transitional Justice are located. Civil society-oriented events, such as SSR conferences and seminars, now on the rise, tend to be in Tunis as well. Also, police training must be held in the government's designated police training centres, which are all located in northern cities, so international trainers rarely venture south. Certain organisations, including Penal Reform International, have organised some seminars in cities outside the capital, such as Kairouan, and ICRC is undertaking an intensive pilot project in Sousse. But these remain exceptions, producing uneven progress in transforming the sector, and especially its much-maligned police.

Proposed Adjustments in Sector

- Increased focus on developing a comprehensive SSR strategy to balance the current emphasis on police training.
- More attention to strengthening the capacity of Tunisian civil society groups to engage constructively with each other and advocate effectively with the Ministry of Interior for key SSR reforms.

JUDICIAL REFORM

Context into which International Expert Assistance Arrived

Prior to Tunisia's democratic opening, the judiciary was a primary target of regime interference. Law 67-29 of 1967 – the most important piece of judicial legislation – allowed the president to handpick members of the Supreme Judicial Council, the body in charge of appointing, promoting, transferring and dismissing judges. Under Ben Ali, outspoken lawyers and judges could find their bank accounts blocked, salaries suspended and passports revoked. Lawyers who demonstrated special loyalty to the regime were rewarded with priority access to cases involving major state companies, while most were left to scramble in the broader market. Such corrupt and clientelistic practices motivated a number of lawyers to mobilise against the regime. Indeed, lawyers played a major role in creating the conditions for Ben Ali's fall.[90]

Since the earliest days of the transition there have been persistent calls to reform the judicial system. Few concrete steps have been taken, however, to definitively remove the judiciary from executive control. Judges' poor working conditions, often characterised by limited human and material resources, have also resulted in serious delays processing cases.[91] Following the October 2011 elections, the Constituent Assembly suspended the Supreme Judicial Council and adopted a provisional constitution that replaced the council with a temporary judicial authority until a High Institute for Judicial Independence (hereafter High Institute) could be installed.

Before it acted to create this temporary authority, the Ministry of Justice – under popular pressure to vet regime-linked judges – decided to briefly reinstate the Supreme Judicial Council. It then endorsed a decision of former Justice Minister Noureddine Bhiri – an Ennahda member who assumed his post after the October 2011 elections – to dismiss 82 judges who were claimed to be incontrovertibly linked to the Ben Ali regime.[92] Bhiri's approach was criticised as arbitrary, non-transparent, and top-down by international and Tunisian human rights groups.[93] The Justice Ministry also came under fire from national groups mandated to defend judges: the Union of Tunisian Judges (SMT), Association of Tunisian Judges (AMT) and Tunisian Observatory for the Independence of the Judiciary (OTIM), which frequently describe the ministry as a "power-centric institution" hesitant to forge partnerships with civil society.

These associations nevertheless present a challenge for judicial reform in their own right, as they have struggled to mount a united advocacy front. Despite sharing roughly the same overall objectives (such as judicial independence and better working conditions for judges), the relationship among the organisations, particularly between the AMT and the SMT, is bitter.[94] Leading members of the AMT maintain that the SMT is composed of old-regime judges who now pander to the Justice Ministry, and the SMT accuses the AMT of being more preoccupied with politics than defending judges' rights. The conflict runs so deep that certain leading AMT members refuse to sit in the same room or at the same table with SMT members.[95] Some local and international analysts have noted that this conflict plays into the hands of the Justice Ministry, which is able to divide and rule more easily in the absence of a united response.[96]

Justice Ministry officials counter that they are committed to judicial reform. They report being "deeply confused" by the AMT's negative response to 2012's mass firings, in particular claiming that the AMT's "constant calls to root out the corrupt judges" motivated the ministry to undertake the firings in the first place.[97] "We still believe there are many more than 82 corrupt judges – maybe as many as 150 out of about 416 judicial administrators are corrupt", said Nizar Nejar, who directs international cooperation at the ministry. "Allowing them to stay on as the High Institute was being created would have biased the very institution that is being formed to protect judges' independence …. Ultimately, we needed the judges' advocacy organisations to be more clear about what they mean by 'reform' instead of making vague recommendations and then faulting us".[98]

Alongside these dynamics is a more general "void": the absence of the High Institute. Establishment of this oversight body is the main priority for local judges and judicial reform experts.[99] An initial enabling law was rejected in the Constituent Assembly in 2012 due to concerns of Ennahda members about financial and administrative independence. The Assembly will reconsider the law in 2013 and, with ministry support, is expected to adopt a modified version.[100] The ministry's April 2013 launch of a National Consultation on Reform of the Judiciary represents another encouraging development.[101] "The political will to reform does exist within the Justice Ministry", noted Issam Yahyaoui of the Centre for Legal and Judicial Studies (CEJJ), a public body attached to the ministry. "But there are still obstacles to judicial independence: executive authorities everywhere are opposed to the true realisation of judicial checks and balances".[102]

Within this overall context, a range of international organisations have delivered expertise to judges and lawyers' associations, members of the Constituent Assembly, and ministries relevant to judicial reform. A chart of those identified in interviews as the main international and national actors in the sector appears in the Appendix.

International-National Dynamics within the Sector

International efforts to reform the judiciary were all but absent before the beginning of Tunisia's democratic transition. For example, the EU had a limited judicial program that ended in 2010 but its objectives were primarily commercial in nature, and not oriented toward major reform. Transformation of the judiciary as a whole has since become a priority. In October 2012, the EU offered a €25 million program aimed at promoting judicial independence and protection of human rights. In parallel, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has assisted intensively with the Justice Ministry to draft a strategic reform plan; it and the OHCHR have worked jointly to encourage the ministry to launch its National Consultation; the Council of Europe's Venice Commission is helping it craft criteria for judicial appointments, as well as assisting the SMT; Germany's Hanns Seidel Foundation contributes expertise to civil society groups, including the AMT; the American Bar Association (ABA) and Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) are focusing on strengthening lawyers' skills and collaboration; and a host of others – including the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the International Development Law Organisation (IDLO), the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law – have helped organise and participate in conferences and seminars.

Authorities in the Justice Ministry, as well as others less directly involved in judicial reform such as the Constituent Assembly and the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, describe receiving an overwhelming array of international interest and offers of support to reform the justice system.[103] They said, however, that many offers do not materialise or add direct value – either because internationals fail to deliver promised expertise or because their expertise does not match ministry needs. Judges' unions and associations similarly felt that internationals have come and gone with no tangible results. According to Nabil Naccache, a leading SMT member, "many discussions with international organisations have raised our hopes. These organisations seemed very interested in our work in the deep interior regions of the country, but have come for occasional seminars or diagnostic types of studies".[104]

A number of international organisations have sent experts to advise Constituent Assembly members on judicial independence issues in the context of the constitutional drafting process. Yet in the opinion of many, including Wafa Zaafrane, a legal adviser at the Assembly, "too much focus on constitution writing has come at the expense of providing assistance on other laws", including bills that would create the High Institute to replace the executive-dominated Supreme Judicial Council.[105] According to Nicole Rowsell of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), these and other issues – such as convincing the Interior Ministry to release its archives on the judiciary and establishing an ethical, merit-based process for judicial appointment – are of "equal importance" and "deserve more attention" than they currently receive.[106]

Conference fatigue was also commonly reported. "There's an impression here that internationals often come and organise things because they have too much money they need to spend", said one judge, "so they come to Tunis and quickly create conferences to spend that money".[107] "There have been dozens of conferences on judicial independence", said CEJJ's Issam Yahyaoui. "It's getting to the point that people are frustrated and don't want to hear them anymore. The classic

model of conferences is outdated and inefficient. The better approach is through workshops with limited participants, or real partnership programs".[108]

As with security sector reform, the durability of international expert assistance is an important consideration, since old-regime allegiances and intra-ministerial restructuring challenges exist and the internal politics and alliances are complex. "We try to stress that transitions aren't just about elections, and that democratisation requires the stabilisation of a new system", said Geoffrey Weichselbaum, country director for Democracy Reporting International (DRI), an international NGO assisting local civil society. "Presence in the field and long-term attention are crucial".[109] But judges and ministry figures noted that internationals have largely pursued short-term engagement with little follow-up, often getting more than they give. "They're coming but with no echo", said SMT president Raoudha Laabidi, reflecting overwhelming respondent sentiment. "They take information, and then they go".[110]

Coordination of international expertise presents another largely unmet challenge, since the actors operate in fragmented pods focusing alternatively on core judicial reform (with the Justice Ministry), broader institutional reform (with the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice), the constitutional framework (inside the Constituent Assembly) or support for civil society (with lawyers' and judges' groups). Yet coordination is difficult even within these pods, as shown by the overlap in judicial training, conferences, and seminars repeatedly noted by Tunisian respondents. Marie-Hélène Enderlin, who oversees the EU judicial reform file, has tried to keep tabs on the sector and coordinate some meetings among internationals. Yet, she notes, "it's quite cumbersome to invite them, to get them all to the meetings. Each donor still wants to be the first one to do various projects. There's a lot of rushing into ad hoc activities".[111]

The Justice Ministry has tried to coordinate some assistance – but this has proven difficult, in part due to inexperience. According to Kalthoum Kennou, president of the AMT, "Tunisians want to have the pride of coordinating international actors, but we don't yet have the ability".[112] The situation is also due to ministerial dysfunctions from the Ben Ali era. "When we first came to this ministry [after the revolution] it was like a ship casting about in the sea", said Chalbi Jelloul, an adviser to the Justice Minister. "The reality is that strategic planning comes with obstacles. Finding time to pursue major reforms or coordinate internationals was difficult when the ministry itself was so disorganised. The archives were in an almost complete state of disarray when we arrived".[113] Efficiency is also hampered by inefficient working conditions. "Organising everyday work with simple things like Internet databases is a massive priority for the ministry", said Nizar Nejar, pointing to the large piles of paperwork on his desk. "Too much is done manually, and the situation is even worse for judicial administrators around the country. It's truly catastrophic".[114]

Some noted that all the attention by and toward international experts has distracted Tunisian groups from developing stronger common platforms. "Local NGOs are focusing too much energy on collaborating with official institutions and internationals at the expense of teaching, training, and collaborating with other civil society actors", observed the SMT's Nabil Naccache.[115] The Justice Ministry, however, appears likely to remain the main axis for judicial reform. In December 2012 it released a four-year "Strategic Plan", drafted with the UNDP. Yet a number of international and local respondents described the plan as a non-consultative judicial reform strategy "written for the ministry alone". Several internationals said they want to be more involved – but according to the EU's Enderlin, "we can only get involved if they ask us. Nobody wants to take the responsibility (for stepping forward first). The government is so afraid of criticism, and we don't want to be seen as infringing on sovereignty".[116]

A consensus exists on all sides, however, regarding the need for more judicial reform awareness and activities in the interior. "This is something we need more help on", the AMT's Kalthoum Kennou stressed. "Local corruption is absolutely terrible. Much more must be done".[117] Judges' and lawyers' organisations also expressed interest in mentoring workshops designed to help them lobby the government more effectively for judicial reforms, as well as spread broader public awareness of the importance of judicial reform issues, which remain poorly understood by the Tunisian public at large. "These are considered 'judges' issues'", noted expert Wafa Zaafrane. "More should be done to mobilise average citizens, since politicians will not respond quickly unless the people apply pressure".[118]

Proposed Adjustments in Sector

- More programs and workshops with the deliberate aim to facilitate horizontal collaboration among civil society organisations and develop their advocacy skills and public education efforts.
- Create incentives and pressure in favour of a coordination system for international actors and activities specialised in the area of judicial reform.
- More attention to legislative changes needed outside the constitutional drafting process.
- Fewer conferences and more small training workshops and sustainable mentorships aimed at developing practical skills for judges.

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

Context into which International Expert Assistance Arrived

Youth unemployment is widely recognised as a primary cause of Tunisia's revolution. The problem is especially acute in the country's interior, where job opportunities are scarce, and among university graduates who, according to the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation, comprise nearly one third of Tunisia's 700,000 currently jobless adults. Jobs must be found for an additional 80,000 young graduates annually.[119]

Structural obstacles make unemployment, particularly for youth, a persistent problem. In interviews, local and international economists noted seven principal obstacles, some of which are tied to the economy's larger structural characteristics and others to the problem of youth unemployment in particular: (1) the low value-added nature of the economy, geared to benefit offshore exporters more than develop skills at home; (2) poor infrastructure in the interior (eg, roads, water, electricity, Internet access); (3) an outsized informal economy; (4) a partially closed economic framework that benefits large public companies, such as Tunis Air and Tunisie Télécom; (5) the relatively low skills of many labourers; (6) the poor quality of most vocational training and local perception that it only serves underachieving students; and (7) the significant mismatch between market needs and university graduates' skills.

Expert respondents cited outdated "job mentalities" as also contributing to youth unemployment. The notion of government as the main jobs creator persists, which can deter people from joining the private sector or creating businesses. "This was how I grew up, and it was how a lot of Tunisians grew up", noted Akram Belhaj Rhouma, an adviser to the Employment Minister. "My father used to tell me, 'my son, you must be employed in a government office'. But we need to get

past the idea that a suit and a government job are the symbols of success".[120] A compounding factor is that would-be entrepreneurs without wealthy friends or family can have great difficulty obtaining start-up capital. Many are unfamiliar with financial services at banks, and tax rules for start-ups are complex. According to Antoine Courcelle-Labrousse, principal operations officer at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), part of the World Bank Group, "an absolute maze" of old-era tax incentives and regulations contribute to corruption and stifle creation of new businesses.[121]

All this presents special challenges for youth, who are often less networked and less valued as financial clients. According to Bertrand Effantin, who directs the Tunisia program at Mercy Corps, an international NGO: "Decision-makers at banks are often especially difficult to meet if you are a young person because you're not seen as serious, competent or bankable".[122] Mohamed Ali Chebâane of the Maghreb Enterprise Development Initiative (MEDI), an organisation working to support youth entrepreneurship in the region, similarly noted that banks "still see young entrepreneurs as people who can't make things happen".[123]

The country's political situation, increasingly seen as too uncertain to attract greater foreign investment, further aggravates the situation. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy highlighted the state's inability to ensure security. Frequent strikes and protests from Gafsa to Bizerte have shuttered businesses, increased operating costs and reportedly driven some investors to countries like Morocco and Turkey where workers are seen as less demanding. "People want everything from the government and they want it now. This is the revolutionary mentality and calling for patience is difficult", said Alya Bettaïeb, Secretary of State for the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation.[124]

These are some of the structural and political challenges for international technical assistance on youth employment. The chart in the Appendix lists the principal international and national actors focused on the issue.

International-National Dynamics within the Sector

Prior to 2011 and the start of the country's transition, youth employment received little outside attention. "Internationals weren't really interested in development problems in general in Tunisia", said Antonio Nucifora of the World Bank. "The country had presented a pretty picture, and too many of us believed it".[125] "Ben Ali wanted to give an excellent image to internationals", said Secretary of State, Alya Bettaïeb. "The 'Tunisian miracle', he called it. Now we are seeing that a lot of the problems – education, unemployment, development – are much worse than we thought".[126]

International financial aid increased dramatically in the transition's first year. The World Bank led major donors (including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the EU and France) in amassing a $1.3 billion package – almost 15 per cent of the 2011 national budget.[127] Internationals also gave economic expertise to policymakers in the Finance, Commerce, Industry, Employment, Investment and Regional Development and Planning ministries. Tunisian respondents nevertheless considered interest and engagement on youth employment very limited. Technical help focused mainly on the structural economic problems outlined above, not on more targeted strategies and programs.

A limited number of international agencies possess the expertise and gravitas to advise on major employment reforms, resulting in a comparatively thinly-populated sector. "I think the problems are just too big and off-putting for most organisations to address – and they are perceived as expert-to-government issues", said a Finance Ministry official.[128] Tunisian officials nevertheless lamented

"constant" meetings with internationals.[129] "Dealing with all the actors and conflicting advice was one of the most challenging aspects", said a member of an Employment Ministry team that drafted the National Strategy of Employment.[130] Internationals countered, however, that the intensity of the schedule and scope of the economic challenges required nothing less than a full-on effort.

Tunisian respondents active in start-up associations and entrepreneurship appear most eager for increased international engagement on jobs for youth – a topic they see as critical but dangerously overlooked. "Some international organisations have been interested in [this] and in micro-enterprise", said Gafsa-based expert Hechmi M'nasri, "but their engagement is fleeting. We need more concrete solutions".[131] Others indicated the need for more constructive private enterprise-civil society partnerships and noted that internationals should look at mechanisms for making Tunisian civil society more economically literate, rather than waiting until the economy's big structural challenges are resolved.

AfDB is spearheading *Souk At-tanmia* (Market of Development), a high-profile program that rewards aspiring young entrepreneurs with small grants and mentorships to start their projects. "People think highly of the program", said MEDI's Mohamed Ali Chebâane. "But it's the exception. Most people can't name any other international organisations or major initiatives on youth and the economy here".[132] Mercy Corps, with less publicised initiatives, has offices in the ten southern governorates. It is conducting foundational studies on youth employment and trying to connect young people to financial aid and jobs. Although a clutch of organisations and programs (including ENDA Inter-Arabe, Maghreb Start-Up Initiative, Education for Employment and Startup Weekend) are present in the sector, other big international actors have not specifically addressed youth unemployment. Yet, respondents noted, there is much room for engagement as a number of local organisations – including ATUPEE, Wiki Start-Up, Tariqi, and MEDI – are working on promoting youth entrepreneurship and related issues.

Government respondents reported that international economic expertise has been highly relevant at times, particularly in pressure periods such as the months immediately after Ben Ali's fall, when the National Strategy for Employment was being drafted. Officials said they often relied on the outside help. Still, many found the expertise formulaic and unreflective of their real needs. "They come with an already determined vision and only want to focus on a specific subject", said Jameleddine Gharbi, the Regional Development and Planning Minister. "The needs in the interior are critical, but they don't look there …. We point, we say, 'look, this is our problem'. But then they point and say, 'no, your problem, it is here'. It's as if you have a red folder, and they try to convince you that 'no, it's blue'".[133]

Tunisian officials also commented that internationals often use economic jargon without helping see how they arrived at their conclusions. "They come with their expertise – highly competent, using mathematical language – and the administrators don't understand anything", noted an official at the Ministry of Regional Development and Planning. "A dependency has been created; when there is a problem in Tunisia, the administrators just write a paper to the internationals asking for help".[134] The perceived result is a weakening of Tunisians' capacity to diagnose their economic problems and propose solutions, and a corresponding strengthening of internationals' confidence in their own advice. "It is very common for internationals to come, ask us for statistics, then take those statistics and come back with a ready-packaged proposal that we must implement", said an Employment Ministry official. "The internationals do not like debate and expect their policies to be accepted because they are the experts".[135]

Internationals disagree and criticised ministries for wanting to do "everything at once": to privatise companies and keep successful coastal businesses competitive while at the same time developing the lagging interior, where youth unemployment is highest. Instead, they argue, a well-sequenced strategy focused on a handful of high-impact reforms would speed short-term growth, raising youth employment and interior development in the long run. "It's more important to build clusters of excellence – to make sure that Tunisia is competitive internationally rather than wanting to develop the interior for the sake of wanting to develop the interior, even when your most competitive areas are losing traction globally", said IFC's Antoine Courcelle-Labrousse.[136]

Local respondents nevertheless tended to question internationals' motives, perceiving them as locked into Western "privatisation and liberalisation policies" that risk harming the youngest and poorest.[137] "What's my recommendation for internationals?" asked one local. "That they listen. I think many aren't. Instead of democracy and transparency, think about how you can bring equality".[138] Given its prominence as a perceived root cause of the revolution, many Tunisians see youth unemployment as a bellwether of international commitment. "This revolution was for poor unemployed youth and people in the interior", said a youth activist from Bizerte, reflecting the opinion of many. "It was about their basic needs and their education. It was for *karama* (dignity)".[139]

Vocational training is one area getting more attention, in particular from the German, French and Japanese development agencies. "This kind of training is more complicated than it sounds", said Jens Plötner, the German ambassador. "With €10 million, we're rehabilitating eight professional training centres and working to redevelop some curricula. But you can only do so much. It is a complex and expensive issue".[140] Regarding broader reform of the educational system and its correlation to the job market, however, few internationals are engaged.[141] "It's off-putting because these issues require such sustained attention, and they don't seem to stand out as much to international actors", noted Anas Elmelki, coordinator of Mercy Corps's office in Gafsa. "After all, unemployed graduates aren't just a problem in Tunisia".[142] In the opinion of Manouba University professor Faiza Derbel, "the internationals probably just don't see the university as a force or priority site of transition".[143]

Many Tunisians stressed that internationals should do more bottom-up projects with young people. "Just spending time with them and showing consideration helps create the idea of change", said Mercy Corps's Bertrand Effantin. "You say 'what if?' to them and it's the beginning of the end of exclusion".[144] Locals, however, commented that attention on issues like youth entrepreneurship often consists of one-off projects. "There are training workshops and discussions at restaurants and nothing else", said M'nasri, describing the experience in Gafsa. "They come to discuss, train, then nothing. It's always the same".[145] Most international initiatives on youth employment, including Mercy Corps's, are just emerging from preliminary diagnostic research, so cannot yet be judged. Aside from Souk At-tanmia, most still have low visibility.

Although Tunisians perceive a big disconnect across international initiatives, small pods of coordination between similar-sized economic actors exist. The World Bank, AfDB and EU tend to coordinate informally. Among international NGOs, Mercy Corps has coordinated with Oxfam, Search for Common Ground (SFCG), and a group of twenty to thirty local NGOs since May 2012. Yet, Tunisian respondents were quick to cite overlapping diagnostic reports and training, and instances where lack of coordination verged on being "a disaster".[146] Civil society activists complained that websites and initiatives were "not easily accessible", and that the multilateral banks were "too involved with the government".[147]

Internationals and Tunisians alike cited lack of reliable data about youth employment as particularly challenging. Because the old regime heavily massaged the figures of the National Institute for Statistics, and internationals "largely bought Tunisia's simulacrum of development", even the World Bank, AfDB and EU had limited understanding of the economy before 2011.[148] For that reason, but also because most international donors prioritise top-down structural reforms, visible help on youth employment has been more delayed than it might otherwise have been. "We internationals didn't have good knowledge of what was happening regarding Tunisia's economy", said Amadou Bassirou Diallo, a senior economist at the AfDB. "Knowledge is a major challenge: we need to know long-term structural factors to address youth employment constructively, and everyone is kind of rushing to do the research".[149]

In the short term there are mainly palliative measures to consider. According to Antonio Nucifora of the World Bank, "Regional development and youth employment are structural challenges. They simply cannot be addressed meaningfully in the transitional period".[150] He and others noted that some strategies have been short-sighted. Among those mentioned was the *Amel* (Hope) Program, an early World Bank project that gave funds to jobless youth who met certain conditions. Introduced during the interim government of Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi, it has been criticised for incentivising recipients to remain unemployed, since it grants 200 dinars (€100) monthly to those who would often make just 100 or 150 dinars more by working full time. Analysts say the program made work seem like a poor investment to many young people.[151]

Yet, a government official noted, "we generally didn't have the capacity to say 'no' to projects in the first part of the transition, even if they didn't fit with our priorities. I think many administrators didn't know how to take the lead – they were so used to being ordered".[152] Employment Minister adviser Akram Belhaj Rhouma said similarly: "I don't believe the World Bank or any other organisation can offer us salvation in gifts. Some of their programs cost us considerable debt …. The lesson is that countries that want to advance need to rely on themselves to work hard".[153]

A final emphasis in interviews was on the importance of targeting youth unemployment in the interior, where it is as high as 50 per cent.[154] Matching programs, educational reforms and entrepreneurial initiatives there are viewed as urgent, albeit more complicated due to gaps in administrative capacity. According to the government's National Observatory of Employment and Skills, "massive needs" exist in the interior.[155] Yet the drive for change is high. AfDB's Amadou Bassirou Diallo said Souk At-tanmia received 2,000 online applications for its youth entrepreneurship competition, "with a massive number of these from the interior".[156] "There is admittedly a problem of culture and mindset", said another economist at AfDB, "but when you see the number of applications … it's amazing how much young people want to innovate. They were in the street calling for change, and they are ready to make changes happen".[157]

Proposed Adjustments in Sector

- More targeted engagement on youth employment – in the interior and more generally across the country – to complement focus on broader structural reforms.
- More sustainable mentorships to increase the economic literacy and policy capacity of Tunisian civil society actors (including start-ups, local NGOs and journalists) working on youth employment.
- More emphasis on training initiatives targeting students and unemployed youth: eg, work-study partnerships with Tunisian colleges, internship opportunities and coaching on access to loans and services.

- More focused engagement with Tunisian educational institutions such as secondary schools, vocational training centres, universities and business schools to enhance student preparedness and develop research and pilot projects on youth employment.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As this research demonstrates, the flow of international expertise into transitional societies can produce a wide range of dynamics and consequences, both positive and negative. In the case of Tunisia – using the lens of international expert assistance on media, security sector and judicial reform and youth employment – a mutually-felt ambivalence in the relationship between nationals and internationals in Tunisia has arisen, despite broadly shared values and end-goals. High initial expectations of the benefits have given way to a palpable and growing ennui.

Following a similar pattern to other contexts, the international machine of expert assistance in the country, at first exhilarating for both parties, began to look like part of the problem. Its size, complexity and entwined thematic corridors are confusing. For nationals on the receiving end, the feeling of a "heavy footprint" is difficult to escape. Working in a sector like judicial reform, for example, one is approached not only by internationals working exclusively on that issue, but also by others engaged in domains as varied as human rights, transitional justice, democratisation and anti-corruption. Scaling back so large a system is a global and structural challenge, not a local and isolated one.[158]

Typically, donors are blamed for the negative aspects, since without their role and actions the system would not exist in the first place. Yet, the explanation is insufficient. Expert institutions are agents in their own right with capacity to study the contexts they enter, conduct serious work, coordinate interventions, and evaluate and continuously improve efforts. International implementers and advisers are more than just symptoms of the problem.

Responsibility, however, does not rest with internationals alone, even if they bear a particular responsibility as "visitors". The longer the Tunisian transition continues, the more the leading national actors and institutions will need to be realistic in their expectations of help. The flow of funds and expertise rises and, inevitably, falls. It begins with a sudden arc upward and ends with a sometimes equally sudden arc downward when the situations of other countries become more fashionable or urgent. Tunisians must formulate their future requests, and accept or decline new offers, with this in mind. They should also begin to take full lead in the relationship by defining the ends of the next phase of their transition and enabling supportive internationals to assist them on their own terms.

Tunisia has already achieved important progress in its transition and in fundamental ways remains a case apart. It is still the country that experts believe has the greatest promise in the region to become a fully open, rule-based democratic society. The transition may be at a new tipping point, however. The security and economic situations are degrading; there is a mounting Islamist and secularist divide, a still-incomplete constitution-making process, and an uncertain elections schedule. The "technical" nature of many issues handled in the transition's first phase – around which internationals could often quickly transfer knowledge – has also largely run its course. Tunisia is entering the period when longer-term, harder-to-identify "adaptive" challenges come to

the fore. These require changes in values and roles, not just laws; involve more integrated policymaking; generate more resistance; and depend more on trial and error than formulas.

The period ahead is certain to be full of traps and pitfalls. Yet if the major national and international actors remain committed to the transition's irreversibility, there is ample reason to expect these can be surmounted.

Recommendations

Based on findings directly generated through this research, below are forward-looking recommendations for Tunisians and internationals to jointly consider. The first are practical suggestions for the short term, meant to complement the report's earlier, more sector-specific recommendations. The second are more general, and intended over the mid-term to strengthen transition processes globally, helping to reduce some of the avoidable patterns this case study documented.

Short-term recommendations for transitional assistance in Tunisia

- *Map the international experts in other priority sectors:* At the start of the Tunisian transition, internationals understandably focused on mapping national actors, as little was known about reform forces prior to the democratic opening. Nationals have a corollary need to know who the international experts are, what they can offer and how they can collaborate. A similar mapping exercise to this report, but covering non-mapped sectors of expert assistance, could benefit national and international actors alike.
- *Strengthen and replicate the model of international expert coordination adopted in the media reform sector:* Lead actors in any uncoordinated policy sector of the transition could prepare a joint funding proposal to hire a person – full time – to facilitate coordination and minimise redundancies in the sector. Though such coordination came somewhat late in the area of media reform, today it facilitates the work of nationals and internationals alike.
- *Build one-stop website portals that consolidate and describe the donor funding and expert assistance available in priority sectors:* One-stop portals, ideally in Arabic, could be included in the above funding proposal and form part of the coordinator job description in each sector. The portals could include conference and training calendars in the same straightforward way as university websites that list events and scholarship opportunities.

Mid-term recommendations for transitional assistance globally

- *Make a one-stop Transition Information Portal an early funded international task in democratic or post-conflict transitions:* Nationals and internationals have important and partly-overlapping information needs in a transition's first few months. Using modern web and mapping technology, a user-friendly, independent portal could serve as a reliable information clearinghouse for all transition stakeholders. It could include material about the most significant institutions, funding mechanisms, events, training courses and case studies. National political guides and sector-specific studies could also be independently commissioned as a first task in transition and then posted on the portal.
- *Develop a "transition preparedness" guide for national actors:* A practical orientation guide would enable locals in transitions to get the best from the international expert assistance machine when it arrives in their country. As this report documents, many dynamics and patterns in the national-international relationship are structural, and thus foreseeable. A knowledge tool and accompanying

workshops enabling nationals to anticipate and respond to the world of cross-border assistance would make an immediate, positive difference in the absence of a plan to rationalise, over the longer term, the system's silos and redundancies.

- *Establish voluntary International Civil Society Principles on Cross-Border Expert Assistance in Transitions:* Bilateral donors have made declarations and commitments, as yet unfulfilled, for more coordinated efforts and integrated policymaking in political transitions (eg, the "New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States").[159] There is currently no equivalent for global civil society, which has many more actors and policy silos and equal need for coordination and integrated analysis on shared policy platforms. A voluntary set of international civil society principles could include commitments, for example, to prioritise: knowledge about the transitioning country's history and politics, sustainable and equal partnerships, the production of sectoral studies, the creation of coordination platforms, and the hiring of local staff and foreign experts who speak the local language. To be effective, the principles could integrate a reciprocal commitment from willing bilateral and private donors. This could take the form of an explicit endorsement of the principles and parallel undertakings to support early and quick-impact research, extend funding cycles, favour joint proposals between locals and internationals, and similar measures.

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[1] A total of 264 in-depth interviews were conducted for this report. National and international respondents included governmental and multilateral officials, foreign diplomats, journalists, academics, NGOs and community leaders. The report does not examine technical assistance provided by national actors to fellow nationals.
[2] The debate began in earnest with Tom Carothers' seminal "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2002). See also the response essays published in *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 3 (2002).
[3] See, eg, Kleinfeld, Rachel. *Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, 2012).
[4] IFIT interview with Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), 8 January 2013.
[5] The interim government of 2011 passed measures that facilitated creation of local civil society groups and allowed foreign NGOs to set up with relative ease. See Decree-law 2011-88 on Associations (published in the Official Gazette no. 74 on 30 September 2011).
[6] These four policy areas are not necessarily receiving the largest share of international technical assistance. The bulk appears to be directed to Tunisian civil society working in broader areas such as human rights, women's rights, and democratic governance.
[7] Regarding the role of donors, the organisations FRIDE, HIVOS and Arab Forum for Alternatives will publish a study in 2013 on foreign funding in Tunisia, as part of a larger joint project on foreign funding in the Arab world. Regarding domestic political issues in the country, see, eg, International Crisis Group reports, "Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge", 13 February 2013; "Tunisia: Confronting Social and Economic Challenges", 6 June 2012; and "Tunisia: Combatting Impunity, Restoring Security", 9 May 2012.
[8] Alliances that are potentially counterproductive for the transition can also form, as for example if local civil society and internationals see one another as the primary vehicles for progress rather than national authorities when the latter are viewed as lacking the political will to reform.
[9] IFIT interview with Raoudha Laabidi, President, Union of Tunisian Judges (SMT), 28 December 2012.
[10] IFIT interviews with, respectively: Souheil Kaddour, Adviser to the Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, 11 February 2013; an official at the Regional Development and Planning Ministry.
[11] IFIT email exchanges with Hotel Africa, Tunis, March 2013.
[12] IFIT interview with Ramy Salhi, Regional Manager, Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders, 21 December 2012.
[13] IFIT interview with member of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, 14 November 2012.
[14] IFIT interviews with Ramy Salhi, 21 December 2012; an official at the Regional Development and Planning Ministry, January 2013.
[15] IFIT interview with Constituent Assembly member, December 2012. Habib Nassar, former senior adviser with the UN in Tunis, noted that many international experts came with very little comparative knowledge in their field. "I remember talking to a brilliant expert from Peru who was unable to understand the Tunisian context because he was analysing it using a 'post-civil war' perspective which is obviously not what the Tunisian transition is". IFIT email exchange with Habib Nassar, 29 March 2013.
[16] IFIT interview with Ramy Salhi, 21 December 2012.
[17] IFIT interview with Mohamed Chagra, member, Youth Association for Employment and Solidarity, 20 December 2012.
[18] IFIT interview with Tunisian law professor, 8 December 2012.
[19] IFIT interview with Hechmi M'nasri, owner and Director, CAP Technologies, 23 January 2013.
[20] IFIT interview with Kerim Bouzouita, web journalism instructor, Higher School of Digital Economy, 21 December 2012.

[21] IFIT interview with Akram Belhaj Rhouma, Adviser to Minister of Employment and Vocational Training, 20 January 2013.
[22] IFIT interview with Naoufel Jamali, former Adviser to the Minister of Employment and Vocational Training, 7 January 2013. Jamali was named the new Minister of Employment in March 2013.
[23] IFIT interview with Raoudha Laabidi, 28 December 2012.
[24] Although not an explicit focus of this report, transitional justice policy was streamlined through a technical commission of the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice comprising six national NGOs and the International Center for Transitional Justice and OHCHR as observers. Some respondents in this research considered it a positive example of inclusive coordination. The Community of Democracies' Task Force for Tunisia, jointly handled by The Netherlands and Slovakia, also attempted large-scale coordination in the area of democracy assistance. Dutch diplomat Lisa Ciska Yaakoubi-van Doorn, who co-chairs it, sought to convince the 27 member embassies to email her information about their activities, so that she could "bring together what donors have and what Tunisians need". This proved difficult, however, since sharing information represented extra work for embassy staffers focused on their own portfolios, partners, and results. IFIT interview, Lisa Ciska Yaakoubi-van Doorn, Political and Cultural Affairs Assistant, Dutch Embassy in Tunisia, 4 January 2013.
[25] IFIT interview with Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) member, 26 February 2013.
[26] IFIT interview with Hosni Mouelhi, Tunisia Liaison Officer, Foundation for the Future, 16 January 2013.
[27] Email exchange with Ibtihel Abdellatif, President and founder, Tunisian Women, 6 March 2013.
[28] IFIT interview with Mouheb Garaoui, President, I-WATCH, 31 December 2012.
[29] Examples include the Justice Ministry's Strategic Reform Plan (released December 2012) and the Employment Ministry's National Strategy for Reform (completed January 2013). The Tunisian government submitted on 3 April 2012 its overall 2012 Action Plan to the Constituent Assembly, which includes a section on security sector reform.
[30] The Investment and International Cooperation Ministry, for example, was merged with the Regional Development and Planning Ministry for ten years before they were split in January 2011. They spent the first months of 2011 – as investors, advisers, and development experts arrived – frantically trying to reorganise.
[31] Many ministries have created international cooperation offices where none existed, since international cooperation under the old regime was strictly controlled by the Agency for External Communication, housed under the Communication Ministry. The new offices are generally staffed by highly competent individuals previously in different ministry positions. Filling their vacated posts is difficult, given limited human and financial resources.
[32] IFIT interview with Alya Bettaïeb, Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation, 9 January 2013.
[33] IFIT interview with ministerial official, December 2012.
[34] IFIT interview with Jamel-Eddine Gharbi, Minister of Regional Development and Planning, 4 February 2013. Many Tunisians interviewed used the words "machine" or "mechanism" to refer to the international assistance apparatus.
[35] IFIT interview with Employment Ministry official, February 2013.
[36] See, eg, "Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life", Pew Research Center (10 July 2012): "Majorities also cite the freedom to openly criticize the government (64%) and having a media that can report news without government censorship (57%) as top priorities for Tunisia's Future". (p. 33). The full survey is available at www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/.
[37] INRIC report, executive summary, April 2012, available at www.inric.tn/fr. See also "Letter of Resignation of Kamel Labidi as Head of Tunisia's INRIC", 14 August 2012, available at www.wpfc.org/?q=node/485/.
[38] Fatima El-Issawi, "Tunisian Media in Transition". Carnegie Papers, July 2012, available at www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/10/tunisian-media-in-transition/co12, p. 1.
[39] IFIT interview with Alexandre Delvaux, Media and Communications Consultant, Swiss Embassy, 16 January 2013. For more general information about the Tunisian media sector, see IFEX Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG), "Spring into Winter? Fragile achievements and exceptional challenges for Tunisian free expression defenders", July 2012, available at www.ifex.org/tunisia/2012/07/10/spring_intowinter/; and UNESCO, "Etude sur le développement des médias en Tunisie", (UNESCO, 2012).
[40] IFIT interview with Nejiba Hamrouni, President, National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT), 14 December 2012.
[41] IFIT interview with Olivia Gré, Head of Tunisia Office, Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), 12 December 2012.
[42] IFIT interview with Abdelkarim Hizaoui, General Director, African Centre for Training of Journalists and Communicators (CAPJC), 12 December 2012.
[43] IFIT interview with Zied Mhirsi, co-founder, Tunisia Live, 12 December 2012.
[44] IFIT interview with Alexander Knipperts, Resident Representative, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, 12 December 2012. The foundation has also introduced an innovative program, "Saturday Debates", with local journalists discussing current topics such as privatisation of state media and opinion polling.
[45] IFIT interview with Abdelkarim Hizaoui, 12 December 2012.
[46] IFIT interview with Abdelkarim Hizaoui, 12 December 2012.
[47] IFIT interview with Steve Buckley, former president of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), 16 December 2012.
[48] IFIT interview with Bechir Ouarda, media consultant, 13 December 2012.
[49] IFIT interview with Abdelkarim Hizaoui, 12 December 2012.

[50] See: www.appui-media-tunisie.com.
[51] Some internationals concurred. Patrick Merienne, First Secretary for Development at the British Embassy, called the situation regarding journalist training "beyond control". IFIT interview, 18 December 2012.
[52] IFIT interview with Larbi Chouika, instructor, IPSI, 12 December 2012.
[53] IFIT interview with Marwan Maalouf, Tunisia Project Manager, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 13 December 2012.
[54] IFIT interview with Kerim Bouzouita, 21 December 2012.
[55] IFIT interview with Caroline Vuillemin, Chief Operations Officer, Fondation Hirondelle, 8 February 2013. Vuillemin emphasised that while Internet-focused assistance is important, many Tunisians rely on television or radio because they have difficulty accessing the Internet or do not consider blogs a credible news source.
[56] IFIT interview with Alexandre Delvaux, 16 January 2013.
[57] Following the French system, internal security forces are divided between police (based mainly in cities) and national guard (based in coastal and rural areas). They perform almost identical duties. For brevity, references to Tunisian "police" refer to both police and national guard.
[58] Querine Hanlon, "The Prospects for Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year after the Revolution", Strategic Studies Institute, September 2012, p. iv.
[59] Bassem Bouguerra presenting at security reform roundtable entitled "Can Police Torture Be History in Tunisia?" Roundtable co-organised by the Tunisian Network for a Successful Society (TUNESS) and Columbia Society of International Law (CSIL), December 2012.
[60] IFIT interview with Ilaria Mussetti, Human Rights and Democratic Transition Officer, also in charge of the European Commission security file, EU Delegation in Tunisia, 21 January 2013.
[61] IFIT interview with Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) member, 8 November 2012.
[62] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official, February 2013.
[63] IFIT interview with Jonas Loetscher, Head of Mission, DCAF Tunisia, 12 December 2012.
[64] See generally, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development DAC "Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) – Supporting Security and Justice" (2007). Given the more limited line of inquiry in this research, the term "security sector reform" is used instead of "security system reform".
[65] IFIT interview with Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Tunisia Adviser, DCAF, 28 December 2012.
[66] Such bilateral engagements exist between the ministry and various foreign actors, including France, the U.S., the EU, and, to a lesser extent, Turkey and Qatar, which have given equipment.
[67] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official, January 2013.
[68] IFIT interview with Joseph Schechla, former Tunisia representative, OHCHR, 2 January 2013.
[69] IFIT interview with Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Tunisia Adviser, DCAF, 28 December 2012.
[70] These observations were routinely encountered; quotes, inter alia, from IFIT interview with Imed Belhaj Khalifa, Spokesperson, National Union of Tunisian Security Forces Syndicates (UNSFST), 20 December 2012.
[71] IFIT interview with Habib Essid, former Minister of Interior, 18 February 2013.
[72] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official, February 2013.
[73] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official.
[74] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official.
[75] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official.
[76] Nearly all international respondents who had dealt with the ministry on security matters used the phrase "shopping list" to characterise how officials presented their needs for more hardware.
[77] IFIT interview with OHCHR, January 2013.
[78] IFIT interview with Jean-Michel Monod, International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), 21 January 2013.
[79] IFIT interview with Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, DCAF, 28 December 2012.
[80] IFIT interviews with Haykel Ben Mahfoudh and Jonas Loetscher, DCAF, 12 and 28 December 2012, respectively; and Akram Khalifa, Human Rights Officer, OHCHR, 8 January 2013.
[81] IFIT interview with Bassem Bouguerra, Founder and Executive Director, Tunisian Institutional Reform (TIR), 17 December 2012.
[82] In January 2013, TIR held a conference that brought together many local and international actors focused on SSR. However, at the conference – as in Tunisian civil society as a whole – attention focused heavily on the Ministry of Interior's failings.
[83] IFIT interview with Sihem Ben Sedrine, journalist, human rights activist and President of the Tunis Centre for Transitional Justice (CTJT), 31 December 2012.
[84] IFIT interview with Bassem Bouguerra, TIR, 17 December 2012.
[85] IFIT interview with Jonas Loetscher, 12 December 2012.
[86] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official, February 2013.
[87] IFIT interview with Interior Ministry official, January 2013.
[88] IFIT interview with Mohamed Lazhar Akremi, 18 January 2013.
[89] While some have praised the ministry's efforts at communication and outreach, others in civil society felt that Khaled Tarrouche has not been an effective spokesman for the ministry, and may have actually damaged its reputation even more.

[90] See, eg, International Crisis Group, "Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East: Tunisia's Way", 28 April 2011; and Gobe, Eric, "Of Lawyers and Samsars: The Legal Services Market and the Authoritarian State in Ben Ali's Tunisia (1987-2011)", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 67, no. 1 (2013), pp. 45-63.
[91] See, eg, "Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders on her Mission to Tunisia (27 September – 5 October 2012)" (25 January 2013), UN doc A/HRC/22/47/Add.2, pp. 11-12.
[92] Bhiri was Minister of Justice from January 2012 to March 2013. He was replaced by Nadhir Ben Ammou.
[93] According to Said Benarbia, Senior Legal Adviser in the Middle East and North Africa Programme for the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), an international NGO, some of these 82 judges were dismissed arbitrarily with little more than a phone call and no access to their files. IFIT interview, 14 March 2013. See also Human Rights Watch, "Letter to the Ministry of Justice Regarding the Dismissal of Judges", 20 December 2012; and "Mass Firings a Blow to Judicial Independence", 29 October 2012.
[94] Many judges, concerned more with working conditions than the conflict between the two groups, are members of both the AMT and SMT.
[95] IFIT interview with Kalthoum Kennou, President, Association of Tunisian Judges (AMT), 11 January 2013.
[96] IFIT interviews with Wafa Zaafrane, Research Associate, University of Tunis Faculty of Law and Adviser, Constituent Assembly, 2 January 2013; Wahid Ferchichi, Professor of General Law, University of Tunis and president of the Tunisian Association for the Defence of Individual Rights, 17 January 2013; Said Benarbia, ICJ, 14 March 2013.
[97] IFIT interviews with Nizar Nejar, Magistrate and Representative of the International Cooperation Department in the Ministry of Justice, and two Ministry of Justice officials, 19 March 2013.
[98] IFIT interview with Nizar Nejar, 19 March 2013.
[99] IFIT interview with Issam Yahyaoui, CEJJ, 19 February 2013.
[100] IFIT interviews with Osama Essaghir, Ennahda MP, 19 March 2013; Nabil Naccache, SMT, 19 February 2013; and Issam Yahyaoui, CEJJ, 19 February 2013. See also Human Rights Watch, "New Law Should Create Independent Judges," 28 March 2013.
[101] The Consultation is a joint initiative of the Ministry of Justice, UNDP and OHCHR. It involves a three-phase country-wide process in which the ministry will consult a wide range of stakeholders (including judges, law clerks, civil society activists and parliamentarians) about various issues regarding judicial reform.
[102] IFIT interview with Issam Yahyaoui, 19 February 2013.
[103] IFIT interview with Souheil Kaddour, 11 February 2013.
[104] IFIT interview with Nabil Naccache, 28 December 2012.
[105] IFIT interview with Wafa Zaafrane, 2 January 2013.
[106] IFIT interview with Nicole Rowsell, National Democratic Institute (NDI), 18 January 2013.
[107] IFIT interview with Raoudha Laabidi, 28 December 2012.
[108] IFIT interview with Issam Yahyaoui, 19 February 2013.
[109] IFIT interview with Geoffrey Weischelbaum, Democracy Reporting International (DRI), 27 January 2013.
[110] IFIT interview with Raoudha Laabidi, 28 December 2012.
[111] IFIT interview with Marie-Hélène Enderlin, Programme Officer, Justice and Institutional Support, EU Delegation in Tunisia, 21 January 2013.
[112] IFIT interview with Kalthoum Kennou, 11 January 2013.
[113] IFIT interview with Chalbi Jelloul, 15 January 2013.
[114] IFIT interview with Nizar Nejar, 19 March 2013.
[115] IFIT interview with Nabil Naccache, 19 February 2013.
[116] IFIT interview with Marie-Hélène Enderlin, 21 January 2013. Her statement echoed views of other interviewed internationals engaged in judicial reform.
[117] IFIT interview with Kalthoum Kennou, 11 January 2013.
[118] IFIT interview with Wafa Zaafrane, 2 January 2013.
[119] IFIT interview with Alya Bettaïeb, Secretary of State, Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation, 9 January 2013.
[120] IFIT interview with Akram Belhaj Rhouma, 9 January 2013.
[121] IFIT interview with Antoine Courcelle-Labrousse, International Finance Corporation (IFC), 11 January 2013.
[122] IFIT interview with Bertrand Effantin, Program Director, Mercy Corps Tunisia, 21 January 2013.
[123] IFIT interview with Mohamed Ali Chebâane, Director, Maghreb Enterprise Development Initiative (MEDI), 20 January 2013.
[124] IFIT interview with Alya Bettaïeb, 9 January 2013.
[125] IFIT interview with Antonio Nucifora, Lead Economist, Tunisia, World Bank, 19 December 2012.
[126] IFIT interview with Alya Bettaïeb, Secretary of State, Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation, 9 January 2013.
[127] IFIT interview with Antonio Nucifora, 19 December 2012.
[128] IFIT interview with Finance Ministry official, December 2012.
[129] IFIT interviews with Finance Ministry officials, January 2013.
[130] IFIT interview with Employment Ministry official, January 2013.
[131] IFIT interview with Hechmi M'nasri, 23 January 2013.
[132] IFIT interview with Mohamed Ali Chebâane, MEDI, 20 January 2013.

[133] IFIT interview with Jameleddine Gharbi, Minister of Regional Development and Planning, 4 February 2013.
[134] IFIT interview with Regional Development and Planning Ministry official, January 2013.
[135] IFIT interview with Employment Ministry official, January 2013.
[136] IFIT interview with Antoine Courcelle-Labrousse, 11 January 2013.
[137] IFIT interviews with Unemployed Graduates' Associations, January-February 2013.
[138] IFIT interview in Gafsa.
[139] IFIT interview with Emna Belhaj (pseudonym), university student, 11 December 2012.
[140] IFIT interview with Jens Plötner, German Ambassador to Tunisia, 18 February 2013.
[141] IFIT interview with Antoine Courcelle-Labrousse, 11 January 2013.
[142] IFIT interview with Anas Elmelki, ACT Program Coordinator, Mercy Corps, Gafsa, 23 January 2013.
[143] IFIT interview with Faiza Derbel, Professor, University of Manouba, 6 December 2012.
[144] IFIT interview with Bertrand Effantin, 21 January 2013.
[145] IFIT interview with Hechmi M'nasri, 23 January 2013.
[146] IFIT interview with Naoufel Jamali, 7 January 2013. He cited the UN's Youth, Employment and Migration (YEM) program, in operation since 2010, as an instance of poor donor coordination.
[147] IFIT interview with Mohamed Ali Chebâane, MEDI, 20 January 2013.
[148] IFIT interview with Hosni Mouelhi, Foundation for the Future, 16 January 2013.
[149] IFIT interview with Amadou Bassirou Diallo, African Development Bank (AfDB), 18 January 2013.
[150] IFIT interview with Antonio Nucifora, 19 December 2012.
[151] IFIT interviews with World Bank, IFC and AfDB officials, 19 December 2012; 11 January 2013; and 18 January 2013, respectively.
[152] IFIT interview with Employment Ministry official, January 2013.
[153] IFIT interview with Akram Belhaj Rhouma, 20 January 2013.
[154] See, eg, Mercy Corps's 2012 reports on youth unemployment: "Southern Tunisia Financial and Non-Financial Services Market Assessment"; and "Market Assessment – Highlights: Financial and Non-Financial Services for Unemployed University and Vocational Education Graduates".
[155] IFIT interview with official at National Observatory of Employment and Skills, 22 February 2013.
[156] IFIT interview with Amadou Bassirou Diallo, Senior Economist and AfDB's Coordinator for the Joint Youth Employment Initiative for Africa, 18 January 2013.
[157] IFIT interview with Audrey Chouchane, Chief Research Economist, AfDB, 18 January 2013.
[158] The international expert assistance industry was not always this massive. It was hardly a factor in some of the most successful transitions in southern Europe and South America before the end of the Cold War. See, eg, the influential work of Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (London, 1996), pp. 72-76. Writing in the mid-1990s, their examination of the "international influence" on democratic transitions omits mention of the role of the experts' industry.
[159] The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, an agreement on a changed global direction for engagement with fragile states, was endorsed by countries and international organisations participating in the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 in South Korea. See generally: www.newdeal4peace.org.

Appendix

Expert Assistance on Media Reform

Main International and National Actors

INTERNATIONALS

Amnesty International (AI)
Article 19
BBC Media Action
Canal France International
Deutsche Welle Akademie
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
Fondation Hirondelle
France 2
France 24
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom

The International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX)
Institut Panos Paris
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR)
International Media Support (IMS)
International Press Institute (IPI)
IREX
Radio France Internationale (RFI)
Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF)
World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC)

Joint International-National Actors

Group of Technical and Financial Partners in Support of the Tunisian Media Sector

expert assistance delivered to

NATIONALS

Governmental Bodies

African Centre for Training of Journalists and Communicators (CAPJC)
Constituent Assembly
Institute of Press & Information Sciences (IPSI)
National Authority for the Reform of Information and Communication (INRIC)

Trade Unions

National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT)
Tunisian Union of Free Radios (STRL)

Associations and Independent Bodies

Observatory for the Freedom of Press, Publishing and Creation (OLPEC)
Tunis Centre for Press Freedom (CTLP)

Media Outlets

Agence Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP)
Local community radios
Nawaat
Radio tunisienne
Télévision Tunisienne 1

Expert Assistance on Security Sector Reform

Main International and National Actors

INTERNATIONALS

Amnesty International (AI)
Dignity - Danish Institute Against Torture
European Union (EU)
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
International Francophone Network for Police Training (FRANCOPOL)
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Penal Reform International (PRI)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)

expert assistance delivered to

NATIONALS

Governmental Bodies

Constituent Assembly
Ministry of Interior

Trade Unions

National Union of Tunisian Security Forces Syndicates (UNSFST)

Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations

Labo' Démocratique
National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT)
Organisation against Torture in Tunisia (OCTT)
Tunisian Association for Citizen Police (ATPC)
Tunisian Institutional Reform (TIR)
Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH)

Expert Assistance on Judicial Reform

Main International and National Actors

INTERNATIONALS

The American Bar Association (ABA)
Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF)
The Council of Europe's Venice Commission
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)
European Union (EU)
Hanns Seidel Foundation
International Development Law Organization (IDLO)
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC)
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law
Office of the High Commissionner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

expert assistance delivered to

NATIONALS

Governmental Bodies

Centre for Legal and Judicial Studies (CEJJ)
Constituent Assembly
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice

Associations and Independent Bodies

Association of Tunisian Judges (AMT)
Tunis Centre for Transitional Justice (CTJT)
Tunisian Bar Association (TBA)
Tunisian Observatory for the Independence of the Judiciary (OTIM)

Trade Unions

Union of Tunisian Judges (SMT)

Expert Assistance on Youth Employment

Main International and National Actors

INTERNATIONALS

African Development Bank (AfDB)
Association for the Right to Economic Initiative (ADIE)
British Council
Education 4 Employment (e4e)
Enda inter arabe (Enda i-a)
European Union (EU)
European Training Foundation (ETF)
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ)
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
Maghreb Start-Up Initiative
Mercy Corps
Microsoft Innovation Center
Silatech
Startup Weekend
Swiss Foundation for Technical Cooperation (Swisscontact)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
The World Bank

expert assistance delivered to

NATIONALS

Governmental Bodies

Constituent Assembly
Digital Entrepreneurship Platform (DEP)
Higher Institute of Digital Economy
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Regional Development and Planning
Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment
National Observatory of Employment and Skills
National Observatory of Youth
Tunisian Chamber of Commerce (CCITUNIS)

Banks and Private Sector

Tunisian Bank of Solidarity (BTS)
Tunisiana
Wiki Start Up

Associations, Non-Profits and Non-Governmental Organisations

Tariqi
Tunisian Entrepreneurship & Spin-off Association (ATUPEE)
Maghreb Enterprise Development Initiative (MEDI)

IFIT

INSTITUTE FOR INTEGRATED TRANSITIONS

About IFIT

The Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) is an independent international initiative based in Barcelona. Currently in its startup phase, IFIT is the first nongovernmental organisation dedicated to the integration of policymaking in the areas of democracy, development, rule of law and security in periods of political transition in fragile and conflict-affected states. Through its global work, the Institute aims to help transform current practice away from piecemeal interventions and toward more comprehensive solutions that can help prevent the recurrence of authoritarianism or civil war in transitioning societies.

Dr. Alex Boraine, the former Deputy Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, serves as the inaugural President of IFIT's Board of Directors; Helen Brewer, former Chief Financial Officer of the International Crisis Group, serves as Vice President; and Mark Freeman, IFIT's Executive Director, serves as Secretary. IFIT's parallel Advisory Group includes Mrs. Maria Livanos Cattaui, former Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce; Professor the Hon. Gareth Evans, Chancellor of Australian National University and former Foreign Minister; Mr. David Gardner, International Affairs Editor and Associate Editor of the Financial Times; Dr. Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Executive Director of Afrobarometer and the Ghana Center for Democracy and Development; Mrs. Latifa Jbabdi, human rights expert and former member of the Moroccan Parliament; Mr. Carne Ross, Executive Director of Independent Diplomat; Mr. Rafael Vilasanjuan, Director of ISGlobal Think Tank and former General Secretary of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International; and Dr. Leslie Vinjamuri, transitions expert and Professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

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